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ABSTRACT 
Title of Dissertation: Maritime Law Enforcement in Nigeria: The Challenges of 
Combatting Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea 
Degree: MSc 
This dissertation is a study of maritime law enforcement against piracy and armed 
robbery at sea in Nigeria. It identifies the challenges of combatting the offences by 
examining national and regional law enforcement measures. 
The research examines the trends in piracy and the causes of piracy. The international, 
national and regional legal framework in place to combat piracy and armed robbery at 
sea are further outlined and analysed with emphasis on their applicability and their 
gaps. Law enforcement measures carried out by national maritime institutions are 
evaluated in order to identify gaps in the measures and to explore the reasons for the 
gaps. The research examines cooperative response against piracy and armed robbery 
at sea at the regional level in order to assess their effectiveness and shortcomings. 
The challenges of combatting piracy and armed robbery at sea in Nigeria and at the 
regional level are identified as well as the efforts made by the Nigerian government to 
reduce the challenges. The conclusion of this research is that, although efforts are in 
place to combat piracy and armed robbery at sea both in Nigeria and at the regional 
level, more effort is needed especially in the aspect of provision of laws at the national 
level and coordination between regional initiatives. 
Key Words – Enforcement, Combatting, Measures, Trends, Causes, Gaps,  
Challenges, Efforts 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Piracy is one of the most significant and direct threats to maritime security (Hassan & 
Hassan, 2016). According to Murphy (2010), piracy is a slippery concept which can 
rarely be applied without some form of caveat or exemption that changes its meaning. 
Though not a political crime, it has often been linked to politics, state power or state 
weakness. Piracy has been in existence for decades; it has taken several forms and has 
been perpetuated for different reasons. The current state of piratical attacks in Nigeria 
reinforces the urgency of effective law enforcement. The success of law enforcement 
both at the national and regional levels depends on a sound knowledge of the 
international law requirements regarding piracy and armed robbery at sea, knowledge 
of the operational environment, awareness of the actors and understanding of the 
nature of piracy in Nigeria and in the Gulf of Guinea (Ali, 2015). 
1.1 Hypothesis 
The hypothesis underlying this research is that the law enforcement against piratical 
activities in Nigeria is inadequate and suffers multiple limitations. 
The central issue discussed in this research is that piratical attacks in Nigeria and in 
the Gulf of Guinea region have increased because of inadequate law enforcement at 
the national and regional levels. The research argues that the current laws in Nigeria 
do not comprehensively address the issues of piracy and armed robbery at sea. It argues 
that the current regional processes have failed to yield a well-defined platform for 
cooperation between states in the Gulf of Guinea region. The research demonstrates 
that, although there are gaps in the international legal framework on piracy, it is 
capable of working successfully to ensure acts of piracy are punished if implemented 
by states. 
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1.2  Aims and Objectives of the Study 
The aim of this research is to provide a comprehensive analysis of the law enforcement 
measures against piratical activities in Nigeria. The objective of the research is to 
identify the gaps in the law enforcement and the challenges of combating piracy and 
armed robbery in Nigeria.  
To achieve the above objective, the dissertation will answer the following questions: 
How adequate are international laws on piracy and armed robbery at sea? What are the 
maritime law enforcement measures available to punish piracy and armed robbery at 
sea in Nigeria and at the regional level? To what extent is Nigerian law on piracy in 
conformity with international laws? How effective are the national and regional efforts 
against piracy and armed robbery at sea in Nigeria? What are the gaps in law 
enforcement measures against piratical activities? What are the challenges that create 
the gaps in law enforcement against piracy and armed robbery at sea in Nigeria?  
1.3 Research Structure 
The research is divided into six chapters. Chapter one will briefly describe the concept 
of piracy. It will further discuss the objectives of the research in detail, outline the 
structure of the study and describe the methodology of the research. 
A general overview of the trends and the nature of piracy and armed robbery at sea in 
Somalia, the Gulf of Guinea and Nigeria is provided in chapter two of this research. 
The factors that contribute to increased piracy and armed robbery at sea are further 
analysed in line with piratical activities in Nigeria. 
Chapter three of this research will analyse international, regional and national legal 
frameworks on piracy and armed robbery at sea, institutional frameworks and their 
gaps therein. The international legal frameworks that are analysed in this dissertation 
are the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas 1982 (UNCLOS), the 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation 1988 (SUA Convention) and its Protocols. 
International records of piracy attacks in Nigeria and in the Gulf of Guinea are 
highlighted in chapter four. Records of law enforcement measures against piratical 
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attacks at the national level are critically analysed in order to evaluate and identify the 
gaps in law enforcement and the challenges causing the gaps. 
Chapter five summarizes the research and provides details of efforts made by Nigeria 
both at the national and regional levels to combat piracy and armed robbery at sea. It 
also highlights the way forward to improve maritime law enforcement in Nigeria. 
Chapter six provides the conclusion of the research. 
1.4  Research Methodology 
To achieve the objective of this dissertation, the qualitative research method is used. 
An evaluation is made regarding the current anti-piracy arrangements in Nigeria and 
in the Gulf of Guinea. The research studies the nature of piracy and armed robbery at 
sea along with existing legal and institutional frameworks directed towards combating 
the offences. A pure legal analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of relevant 
international, regional and national legal frameworks is undertaken to determine the 
extent of their effectiveness. The research provides a descriptive and logical analysis 
of secondary data, such as national and international organizational reports and 
records, journals, previous research, existing literature, newspapers, and online 
publications. 
1.5  Significance of the Study 
This topic was selected because of the dramatic increase in piracy in Nigeria since 
2016. The dissertation is important because it provides the needed intellectual input 
for understanding the difficulties faced by maritime law enforcement institutions at 
national and regional levels, and how the difficulties limit their efforts to combat piracy 
and armed robbery at sea. 
The research also makes a unique contribution to the growing literature on maritime 
law enforcement against piracy in Nigeria and it lays a foundation for further research 
in this area.  
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2 OVERVIEW OF PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AT SEA 
Piracy has always been described in an unrealistic fashion by writers, filmmakers and 
people who fantasize about sailing the seas of endless blue. The truth is that piracy of 
today is a violent, bloody and ruthless practice and it is a major cause for concern 
(Abhyankar, 2007). In the past, the deployment of multinational forces around the 
Horn of Africa, particularly off the east coast of Somalia, made it seem like piracy was 
a Somali problem. Just as piracy is not a new issue to shipping, it is also not a problem 
of only one or two states. It is not just a Somali problem but an international affliction 
on maritime trade, a global problem that requires international support and cooperation 
amongst sovereign states. It exists in places like Indonesia, the South China Sea, 
Malacca straits, South America and West Africa and the trends in piracy are quite 
different (Baker, 2013). Modern piracy is usually carried out by a highly sophisticated 
criminal organization that is equipped with fast boats and communication equipment. 
These experienced criminal organizations attack and rob ships, kidnap crew and 
sometimes engage in ‘phantom shipping’, which involves, taking the entire ship and 
its cargo, changing the colour of the ship and obtaining fake registration documents 
for the vessel which may be sold or used by the pirates for their shipping needs 
(Gagain, 2010). This chapter, therefore, seeks to give an overview of the trends of 
piracy and armed robbery at sea, particularly in the eastern and western parts of Africa; 
the nature of piracy in Nigeria; as well as factors that contribute to increased piracy 
and armed robbery at sea. 
2.1  Trends of Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea: Somalia, Gulf of Guinea and 
Nigeria 
The term piracy tends to imply uniformity in the way the offence is carried out. 
However, this is not the case because the behaviour and strategies of pirates throughout 
the world vary. In other words, while piracy as an act remains fundamentally the same, 
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the trends in various regions are not the same (Haywood & Spivak, 2012). This section 
will therefore analyse trends of piracy and armed robbery at sea in Somalia, Nigeria 
and the Gulf of Guinea. 
2.1.1  Somalia piracy 
In Somalia, the majority of the piratical attacks occur on the high seas and are generally 
carried out by persons known as foot soldiers who are mostly juveniles. The foot 
soldiers are the lower level pirates that are financed by certain persons known as the 
financiers. These financiers of piracy in Somalia are not involved in the acts but they 
are known to exist and profit greatly from the piracy business (Hodgkinson, 2013). 
Initially, Somali pirate groups were loosely organized; they had little equipment and 
scant membership, but, with time, they transformed into a well-resourced efficient and 
heavily armed syndicate which employs hundreds of people (Geib & Petrig, 2011). 
Specific trends in Somali piracy include the geographic expansion of piracy activities, 
increased cost of ransom, increased length of captivity of hostages and increased 
violence towards hostages. Somali piracy developed from the use of small boats to 
attack large vessels, to the hijacking of certain vessels, particularly fishing vessels. The 
hijacked vessel is operated far off the coast as a mother ship to launch faster and readily 
manoeuvrable smaller crafts which are used to attack large vessels, and transport 
proceeds of attacks as well as hostages to the mother ship. In this way, the pirates 
extend their operational range and also avoid near shore enforcements (Haywood & 
Spivak, 2012). Another trend in Somali piracy is the rate at which ransom cost 
increased. In 2010 – 2011 when Somalia piracy was at its peak, piratical attacks were 
reported to have caused significant losses for shipping companies and boosted the sale 
of kidnap and ransom policies for insurance companies (Hodgkinson, 2013).  As a 
result of the high ransom cost, the negotiation time also increased, thereby leaving 
hostages to endure longer captivity and increased violence from pirates. In recent 
years, the number of Somali piracy attacks has reduced significantly due to the law 
enforcement measures carried out by international, national and regional players and, 
today, the piracy problem in Africa has shifted to the west coast off Nigeria, in the 
Gulf of Guinea (Baker, 2013). 
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2.1.2 Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea  
The Gulf of Guinea region is part of the Atlantic Ocean off the Western African Coast, 
as shown in Figure 1 below. Generally, states in West Africa are referred to as the Gulf 
of Guinea states, but sometimes the Gulf of Guinea is used to refer to an area that 
includes several west and central African countries (Tepp, 2012). 
 
Figure 1: Map of Gulf of Guinea 
 
Source: Adapted from (Seidou, 2017) 
 
The region’s geostrategic and maritime potential is quite attractive because it is 
endowed with enormous mineral and marine resources. Nearly 70 percent of Africa’s 
oil production is concentrated in the west coast of the Gulf of Guinea (Onuoha, 2012). 
The Gulf of Guinea is also one of the most important shipping lanes in the world, 
serving as free transit for international and regional trade and an alternative route for 
shipping when the Suez Canal is closed. (Hassan & Hassan, 2016). Its maritime 
affluence, however, coexists with many maritime afflictions, of which piracy and 
armed robbery at sea is growing in nature and frequency (Onuoha, 2012). Recently, 
the Gulf of Guinea has become the leading hot spot for piracy in Africa due to the 
increased number of attacks within the region (Onuoha, 2013).  
Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea has been in existence for a long time but it started 
developing rapidly in the 1990’s when pirates were focused on attacking high value 
assets at sea. The trend in piracy attacks in the past was more traditional because it 
involved hijacking the vessel, forcing it to sail to an unknown destination where the 
cargo was siphoned into the pirate’s vessel, and releasing the hijacked vessel after the 
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transfer of cargo (Tepp, 2012). Pirates were more focused on stealing ships and cargo 
rather than hostage taking. In recent years, however, piracy in the Gulf of Guinea has 
shifted from the traditional type of piracy to a modern day piracy involving kidnapping 
of the passengers and crew of ships for ransom (Hodgkinson, 2013). 
 
2.1.3 Nigeria piracy and armed robbery at sea 
Contemporary piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, is a Nigeria- centric problem. Unlike the 
Somali piracy, which occurs mostly in the high seas, much of the piracy in the Gulf of 
Guinea occurs in Nigerian territorial waters (Ashiru, 2016).  According to Kamal-
Deen Ali (2015), Nigeria accounts for 80 percent of reported piracy incidents in the 
Gulf of Guinea and it stands out as the epicentre of Gulf of Guinea piracy. 
In Nigeria, there is a complex relationship between piracy and the legacy of oil and 
one could say the two issues are interwoven because piracy in Nigeria occurs mainly 
in the resource rich Niger Delta region (Otto, 2014). Piracy in Nigeria started from 
small scale petty robbery of personal effects of crew and ship equipment onshore, but 
quickly became more organized and pirates began to operate in larger numbers and 
with faster crafts. Due to the oil production and trade in the Niger Delta region, oil 
theft, attacks on offshore installations as well as attacks on vessels carrying petroleum 
products became bigger targets (Otto, 2014) 
With the establishment of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta 
(MEND), piracy took a new turn in Nigerian waters and off its coast. The MEND, 
according to experts, is an organized group which is a loose coalition of armed militias 
who are motivated by local grievances. They were involved in kidnapping of oil 
workers, theft of crude oil, raids on ships and constant attacks on installations (Watts, 
2008). Their activities increased instability in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria and 
this in turn led to increased attacks on ships at sea, river crafts and oil platforms. Today 
piracy and armed robbery attacks at sea have moved from violent armed robbery 
attacks to theft of whole ships, kidnap and ransom and sometimes sabotage (Murphy, 
2010). 
 8 
 
 
2.2 Factors that Contribute to Increased Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea 
The circumstances that give rise to piracy and armed robbery at sea are complex and 
have many sides. There is no conclusive or universally accepted list of factors 
responsible for piracy and armed robbery at sea, but some of the most consistent 
factors include weak law enforcement, weak security, poverty, economic hardship and 
socio-political instability. A state may not necessarily have all these factors; however, 
where all or most of the factors are available, there is a likelihood for piracy to emerge 
and flourish. Martin Murphy (2010) proposed seven major factors that motivate piracy, 
lessen the risk of capture or detention and help protect pirates. The factors include: 
legal and jurisdictional opportunities, favourable geography, conflict and disorder, 
underfunded law enforcement, permissive political environment, cultural acceptability 
and reward. This section will, therefore, analyse the seven factors accordingly. 
2.2.1 Legal and jurisdictional opportunities 
This factor exists not only in Nigeria or in Africa but across the world. Even before 
the existence of international laws of the sea, piracy was a crime of universal 
jurisdiction and even when pirates were regarded as enemies of all mankind, they were 
subject to prosecution under domestic laws (Murphy, 2011). Today the shipping 
industry is highly industrialized in the sense that a ship may have a particular 
nationality, the crew may have different nationalities, and the insurance company, 
different still. In such a case, finding a state that is willing to take up jurisdiction may 
be difficult. The state would usually consider the fact that the evidence trail can be 
easily corrupted, the need to bring witnesses from their home countries when the 
proceedings commence, the cost of a trial, and the fact that chances of conviction are 
often low. Issues of arrest made at sea are likely to result in persons being held longer 
than the required time specified by domestic laws, thereby giving the defendants the 
right to claim human rights breaches. Additionally, a person convicted for piracy may, 
upon release, seek asylum in the prosecuting country, particularly in developed 
nations. Due to these reasons most states may be unwilling to take up jurisdiction, 
hence enforcement measures frequently end up in a catch and release situation 
(Murphy, 2011). 
 9 
 
 
2.2.2 Favourable geography 
Pirates consistently carry out attacks in places that they find rewarding, places with an 
acceptable level of risk and places where they can easily find a place of refuge. The 
most favourable location where piracy occurs is in seas that are narrowed due to the 
presence of straits, bays, estuaries and archipelagos, whereby, for navigation or 
commercial reasons, ships are forced to sail slowly and closer to shore (Murphy, 2010). 
As a result of the slow movement of vessels in these geographic locations, it becomes 
easier for pirates to board the vessels and more difficult for the vessels to take evasive 
action. 
Although most countries in Africa do not have these geographic conditions, some ships 
sailing into Nigeria, especially tankers, are subject to similar conditions. Nigeria ranks 
amongst the largest oil exporters in the world and the majority of its oil is produced in 
the Niger Delta region. Due to the volatile nature of the region and constant attacks on 
oil installations offshore, extracted oil is usually channelled to inshore terminals. In 
order for vessels to load oil from the inshore terminals, the tankers, supply ships and 
tugboats are required to navigate close to shore and sail in constrained waters. This 
usually makes the vessels targets for pirates (Tepp, 2012). 
2.2.3 Conflict and disorder 
Piracy, like other crimes, usually thrives when there is any form of turbulence created 
by violent turmoil. In regions where there are weak or non-existent governing 
authorities, anarchy and predation increases and results in a wide scale of criminal 
activities including piracy (Tepp, 2012). An example of such a situation is the case of 
Somalia. The collapse of its central government during the war in the 1990’s, and the 
resulting absence of governing authority in the coastal area, led to the rise of piracy in 
the Gulf of Aden. Another example of such conflict is that between the MEND and 
the Nigerian government. The MEND’s constant fight with the Nigerian government 
and its declaration to attack all government facilities, personnel, vessels and 
infrastructures of foreign companies paved the way for pirates who use the cloak of 
insurgency to cover their predation (Tepp, 2012). 
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2.2.4 Underfunded law enforcement and inadequate security 
Inadequate state funding and training of law enforcement personnel is a factor that 
contributes to increased piracy because many states cannot afford to employ a 
considerable number of law enforcement officers, nor can they afford the equipment 
required to carry out law enforcement (Murphy, 2010). Sometimes underfunding 
occurs because some states give priority to land based forces, particularly the Army, 
while they neglect the Navy, Air force and Coast guard. This results in ill-equipped 
and underfunded maritime law enforcement agencies, thereby making them unable or 
unwilling to perform their assigned responsibilities (Onuoha, 2013). A state that has 
weak institutions and law enforcement due to funding of law enforcement agencies or 
training of personnel may find it difficult to apprehend pirates. Even where it does 
apprehend pirates, prosecuting the few arrested is less likely, and securing a conviction 
may be difficult (Onuoha, 2013). 
Inadequate security by shipping companies has also been identified as a contributing 
factor to piracy. It is the responsibility of shipping companies to establish best 
management practices to protect its ship, especially when the vessel is navigating 
through piracy hotspots (Murphy, 2010). According to Murphy, the precautions could 
be to assign extra watches that would lookout for possible pirate vessels in order for 
the vessel to send distress calls on time. The vessel could also prime fire hoses to be 
used against small crafts if they get close to the vessel. The company could also fit 
secure locks to doors and install sophisticated equipment, such as high voltage fences, 
to scare off pirates. 
2.2.5 Permissive political environment 
For piracy to thrive, it requires not just weak law enforcement, but also lax law 
enforcement. Most often, the laxity of law enforcement develops as a result of 
corruption of law enforcement officials or governing authorities. When this is the case, 
piracy increases, especially in areas where there is insufficient security and abundant 
targets (Tepp, 2012) 
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2.2.6 Cultural acceptability 
According to Martin Murphy (2010), piracy is most likely to have roots in areas with 
a maritime tradition and skills that go with it. In areas such as Southeast Asia, piracy 
may have deeper roots because important trading routes have divided the archipelagos 
in the region for centuries, making piracy a way of life that has been established for 
generations on a clan or family basis. An example of such maritime tradition and skills 
is the Tausug communities of the Sulu archipelago, which stretches between the 
southern Philippines and Borneo. In the communities, piracy was encouraged among 
the men and was associated with highly regarded virtue (Murphy, 2010). While it is 
possible for piracy to have roots in countries with maritime tradition and skills, this 
may not be the case for some countries such as Nigeria, which has no cultural affinity 
with the sea. In this case, piracy can take root in established social practices or 
contemporary imperatives (Murphy, 2011). Although Nigeria does not have a culture 
of piracy, the crime thrives due to social acceptance by the riverine communities of 
the Niger Delta, where many of the people suffer from poverty and unemployment 
because their economic activities have been affected by oil pollution (Tepp, 2012). 
2.2.7 The promise of reward 
No matter how great an opportunity is, it would not be exploited without the promise 
of enrichment. This is evident from the Niger Delta region where the villagers of the 
riverine communities are unable earn a living from small scale fishing as a result of 
pollution of community waters by oil companies. The high level of unemployment and 
poverty has led to the crime being perceived as a career option, especially in the 
communities where pirates stand out as the richest people and role models to young 
persons (Tepp, 2012). 
 
In summary, piracy could be referred to as a crime of opportunity, a crime that would 
flourish where there is low risk to pirates either because of suitable geography, a busy 
seaway, conflict and disorder in a state and most of all poor counter piracy measures. 
It is evident from the discussion on the nature and trends of piracy in Nigeria that the 
counter-piracy measures adopted have been largely ineffective. This is premised on 
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the fact that, just as some of the factors responsible for increased piracy are present in 
Nigeria, the same factors apply in Somalia. Regardless of the factors, however, piracy 
has reduced off the coast of Somalia. It follows, therefore, that adequate strategies 
could repel piracy regardless of the presence of certain factors which would naturally 
be responsible for increased piracy. To determine the challenges faced by Nigeria in 
adopting positive strategies to repel piracy and armed robbery at sea, it is important to 
look into the measures in place to combat the offences. The next chapter will, 
therefore, analyse the law enforcement measures available in Nigeria to combat piracy 
and armed robbery at sea. 
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3 LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR COMBATTING 
PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AT SEA IN NIGERIA 
In discussing the law enforcement measures available to combat piracy and armed 
robbery at sea in Nigeria, this chapter will analyse the existing international, national 
and regional legal frameworks and their gaps. It will further discuss the available 
institutions responsible for maritime law enforcement at the national and regional 
levels and their various roles in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea.   
3.1 International Legal Framework 
Currently the international legal framework on piracy is the UNCLOS and the 
principle of customary international law finds its most lucid expression in Articles 100 
-107 of UNCLOS (Ali, 2015). 
The United Nations Security Council Resolution 2039, in line with the Security 
Council Resolution 2018 relating to the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea 
in the Gulf of Guinea, reaffirms “that international law, as reflected in the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 (UNCLOS) in 
particular its Articles 100, 101 and 105 sets out the legal framework applicable to 
countering piracy and armed robbery at sea as well as other oceans activities.” While 
the UNCLOS is clear about piracy, it has nothing to say about armed robbery at sea. 
As a result of this, a range of other rules have evolved from treaties drafted to address 
violence at sea in various forms (Geib & Petrig, 2011).  
Armed robbery at sea is not a standing legal term but a notion commonly used to 
designate activities that occur in a state’s territorial sea. In 1986, the Council of the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) decided that armed robbery at sea required 
its urgent attention; therefore, in order not to delay, it set up an Ad Hoc committee 
which was opened to all states to prepare, on priority basis, a draft convention. The 
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committee agreed on a draft convention in 1987 and in 1988 the SUA Convention was 
adopted by a diplomatic conference convened in Rome (Geib & Petrig, 2011). The 
Convention did not specifically define armed robbery at sea but it is a treaty which 
deals with violent acts against ships and persons on board (Murphy, 2007); hence, its 
provisions cover any violent acts at sea which could be piracy or armed robbery at sea. 
In discussing the international legal framework, this section will focus on UNCLOS, 
particularly the requirements in Articles 100, 101 and 105, and the SUA frameworks. 
3.1.1 The requirement of the UNCLOS 
Article 100 UNCLOS provides for a general obligation of states to cooperate in the 
repression of piracy when encountered at the high seas or in any other place outside 
the jurisdiction of a state. This duty to cooperate is the first provision on piracy in 
UNCLOS and it provides an appropriate benchmark as a framework for the substantive 
provisions that follow. The provision serves as a guiding principle in identifying the 
specific obligation imposed on states. An example of the obligation on states to 
cooperate is the duty to share relevant information that can help prevent piracy attacks 
and facilitate prosecution of suspected pirates. For emphasis on the importance of 
cooperation, Article 100 UNCLOS expressly provides that all states shall cooperate 
‘‘to the fullest possible extent’’ (Gottelieb, 2013) 
While states have the obligation to cooperate in repressing piracy, a state must first 
ascertain what constitutes the act of piracy in order to effectively combat the offence. 
The definition of piracy can be found in Article 101 UNCLOS which provides that 
piracy consists of any of the following acts: 
(a) ‘Any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, 
committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a 
private aircraft, and directed: 
(i) On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or 
property on board such ship or aircraft; 
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(ii) Against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the 
jurisdiction of any state; 
(b) Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an 
aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate-ship or aircraft; 
(c) Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in 
subparagraph (a) or (b).’ 
The above definition appears simple and straightforward at first glance; however, 
when it is examined closely it becomes clear that the wording contains certain complex 
requirements which must be carried out for an act to be referred to as piracy (Ali, 
2015). Identifying these requirements to determine what constitutes piracy and what 
does not is the first major step to combatting piracy. Article 101 of UNCLOS demands 
that for an act to be deemed as piratical, it must have the following features; 
3.1.1.1 The acts of piracy must be committed on the high seas 
This requirement is fundamental to the exercise of jurisdiction over piracy because it 
has to do with the place of offence. The UNCLOS definition limits piracy to acts that 
occur on the high seas or a place outside the jurisdiction of any state. In line with 
articles 55, 58 and 88- 115 of the UNCLOS, the high seas in this context include all 
waters beyond the territorial sea of a state, such as the contiguous zone and the 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ). This means that acts of violence against ships in 
territorial waters or internal waters of a state are not regarded as piracy under 
international law (Ali, 2015). 
3.1.1.2 The violent acts must be solely for private ends 
Another issue which seems to be a very complex requirement of the crime is that the 
act must be committed for ‘‘private ends”. From this requirement, piracy may be 
motivated as a result of hatred or revenge; however, politically motivated acts cannot 
be said to fall under the international law definition of piracy (UNCTAD, 2014). This 
requirement tends to be very problematic, especially because of the need to prove the 
private motive of a crime. It restricts the scope of piracy such that a person may escape 
conviction if it can be proved that the acts were committed for public ends (Ali, 2015). 
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This feature shifts the definition of piracy away from acts which are political in nature, 
thus setting aside acts of insurgency and terrorism which are major problems in 
Nigeria, especially in the Niger delta where the militants are seen to engage in piratical 
activities in order to increase their influence and funding (Best, 2015). 
3.1.1.3 The act must have involved two vessels 
The third requirement provided by Article 101 of the UNCLOS is that, for an act to be 
called piracy, more than one vessel must be involved. This means that the act must be 
committed by the crew or passengers of a private ship against another ship. Under this 
requirement, attacks against some platforms at sea, or internal hijack of vessels by 
ship’s crew, resulting in kidnap and ransom cases, do not fall under the UNCLOS 
definition of piracy (UNCTAD, 2014). 
On one hand, it is important to understand what constitutes the offence of piracy; 
however, understanding what constitutes piracy is not sufficient enough to counter the 
offence. Enforcement measures are key to combatting piracy and for a state to enforce 
its laws on suspected pirates, it needs to understand the jurisdictional aspect of the 
offence in order to criminalize it. 
International law regards piracy as universally cognizable; hence, any nation could try 
pirates it has caught regardless of the location on the high seas in which they were 
apprehended, or the nationality of the pirates (Kontorovich, 2004). Article 105 
UNCLOS places a universal jurisdiction on states and authorizes all states to take 
enforcement measures against pirate ships or ships taken by piracy and under the 
control of pirates. This right is an exception to the exclusivity of a flag state’s 
jurisdiction over vessels flying its flag as provided for in Articles 92 and 94 of the 
UNCLOS (Geib & Petrig, 2011). Since piracy provides an independent basis for 
jurisdiction under international law, there need not be any jurisdictional link between 
the state exercising jurisdiction and the suspected pirates. By Article 105, states can 
criminalize piracy in their national legislation and set out relevant sentences for those 
convicted of piracy (UNCTAD, 2014). Thus, pirates may be prosecuted by the legal 
system of any state regardless of the flag of the vessel attacked, the flag of the vessel 
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used to commit the offence or the nationality of the pirates (Ali, 2015). In practice, 
however, a state may be reluctant in taking counter-piracy measures as a result of 
certain constraints which may include logistics or inadequacy of the domestic legal 
framework to prosecute the offence (Ali, 2015). As a result, pirates may use this to 
their own advantage by moving between jurisdictions to avoid capture, bearing in mind 
the states that give priority to the suppression of the offence and the resources they 
allocate to it (Murphy, 2007) 
3.1.2 The SUA framework 
The SUA framework originated as a result of the hijack of the Achille Lauro in 1985. 
The Achille Lauro was an Italian cruise ship which was hijacked by an armed group 
who claimed to be members of the Palestinian Liberation Front. The group held the 
passengers and crew of the ship hostage and demanded the release of 50 Palestinians 
that were in prison in Israel. The hijacked ship had passengers and crew from different 
nationalities; hence, there was a need for the states to cooperate. Cooperation failed 
and, as a result of this, each government tried to solve the case separately. The problem 
with the case was that it was not regarded as piracy because the armed group who 
hijacked the vessel hid illegally within the ship and, after the hijack, they made 
political demands. For these reasons, their act could not be brought under Article 101 
of the UNCLOS (Monji, 2014). 
This incident revealed some important gaps in the piracy rules contained in the 
UNCLOS; therefore, it necessitated the adoption of the SUA Convention (Geib & 
Petrig, 2011).  The purpose of the convention was to ensure that there is an instrument 
which would fill the gaps in international law relating to illegal acts against merchant 
shipping. Therefore, the convention was made applicable to any act that could have an 
adverse effect on the safety of navigation at sea whether or not such acts falls within 
the definition of piracy under conventional or customary law of the sea (Mensah, 
2011). 
Article 3 of the convention prohibits attacks on ships and attempted attacks. It provides 
for a long list of unlawful acts that threaten the safety of maritime navigation without 
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specifically mentioning piracy or armed robbery at sea; however, the offences listed 
in the provision may be fulfilled by pirates and armed robbers at sea (Geib & Petrig, 
2011). 
Pursuant to Article 3, a prohibited offence is an act by anyone who unlawfully or 
intentionally: 
(a)     ‘‘seizes or exercises control over a ship by force or threat or any other form of 
intimidation; or 
(b)      performs any act of violence against any person on board a ship if the act is 
likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship.’’ 
Unlawful acts in the above provision could be piracy or armed robbery at sea and such 
acts constitute an offence whether or not it comes from within or outside the ship or 
regardless of the motive of the actors (Ali, 2015). This Article is aimed towards 
ensuring that politically motivated attacks could be prosecuted by states (Dutton, 
2012). An important feature of the SUA Convention is its uniqueness in defining 
offences and the requirement for states to provide penalties according to the severity 
of the offence. Article 5 provides that state parties must appropriate penalties for 
enumerated offences according to the gravity of each offence.  This, therefore, means 
that states must ensure that, in their national laws, the sanction is adequate for the 
offence (Mukherjee, 2002).  
Another requirement of the SUA Convention is the extended geographical jurisdiction 
available to state parties against unlawful acts. Unlike the UNCLOS, which limits 
piracy to the high seas, by Article 4 of the SUA Convention, states parties have the 
right to prosecute acts of piracy carried out on a ship navigating or scheduled to 
navigate to or from the territorial waters of a state (Geib & Petrig, 2011).  
In addition to extended geographical jurisdiction, the SUA Convention gives state 
parties jurisdiction over acts of piracy. Article 6 of the Convention provides for ‘‘state 
parties’’ to take necessary measures to establish jurisdiction over unlawful acts when 
the offence is committed against a ship flying its flag or, the offence occurred in its 
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territory or, the offence was committed by its national or, the national of the state was 
a victim of the offence or, the offence was committed by a stateless person whose 
habitual residence is in the state or, the offence was committed in attempt to compel 
the state to do or abstain from doing an act. Unlike the UNCLOS, universal jurisdiction 
is not exercise over acts of piracy under the SUA Convention and only signatories to 
the convention may prosecute violations of the convention, but they would require 
some form of connection to the offence as provided in Article 6, in order to prosecute 
piracy or armed robbery at sea (Dutton, 2012). 
The SUA convention also imposes a strong requirement on state parties to cooperate. 
In line with Article 7 of the Convention, state parties are granted the right to take into 
custody suspected pirates or armed robbers at sea arrested in their territory regardless 
of whether the state wants to prosecute the offender or not. The state is required to 
extradite the suspect to a state that makes an extradition request either by using an 
existing extradition treaty or by using the convention as the basis of the extradition. 
However, where the state fails to extradite, it is mandated without exception to 
prosecute the suspected pirate (Ali, 2015). 
The SUA Convention was adopted together with the Protocol for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf 
1988 (1988 SUA Protocol). The 1988 SUA Protocol was adopted because, it was 
thought that unlawful acts at sea were not limited to ships but also applicable to 
offshore installations (Kaye, 2007). The Protocol focused on the safety and security of 
platforms attached to the seabed and it applies to artificial islands, installations and 
structures engaged in exploration and exploitation of the seabed, or engaged in other 
economic purpose. The offences under the 1988 SUA Protocol include seizure or 
taking control of fixed platforms, threatening the safety of the platform and causing 
injury or death to persons on board fixed platforms (Kaye, 2007). Although the SUA 
Convention and Protocol of 1988 were far reaching in terms of unlawful acts at sea, 
there were still concerns that the two instruments were not all encompassing. The 
terrorist attack against the United States on 11 September 2011 increased the concern 
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that ships could be hijacked and used as weapons against other ships, and thus the 
international response to address the issue was the adoption in 2005 of two new 
Protocols to the 1988 SUA Convention and the 1988 SUA protocol. The instruments 
are: The Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation and the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety 
of Fixed Platforms. These protocols extended the scope of offences to include acts 
which cause serious injury or damage by use of any kind of explosives, biological, 
chemical, nuclear or radioactive materials (Ali, 2015). 
Although the SUA Convention and Protocols remedy some of the gaps in the 
UNCLOS provision on piracy, it is not without shortcomings. It is argued that the 
requirement of jurisdictional link between alleged offenders and state parties 
prosecuting them seriously undermines the notion of universal jurisdiction applicable 
to piracy offences and that some of the provisions of the Convention may allow 
suspected offenders to escape punishment. Particularly, reference has been made to 
Article 11 of the Convention that it fails to impose real obligation to prosecute and 
punish offenders (Hasan, 2014). It is also argued that the obligation to extradite using 
the convention as a legal basis or any specific treaty is not absolute and may be 
frustrated by political will (Hasan, 2014). 
Like the UNCLOS, the SUA Convention and its Protocols have the potential to be a 
useful instrument in fighting piratical activities. Its application largely depends on how 
states applies its provisions. 
3.2 National Legal Framework on Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea 
To combat piracy and armed robbery at sea, the UNCLOS and SUA Conventions rely 
heavily on corresponding domestic laws. Both the UNCLOS and SUA Conventions 
require States to take appropriate measures to combat the offence. This means that 
mere ratification of the conventions is not sufficient for a state party to effectively 
suppress the offence. The most important task for state parties to these conventions is 
to incorporate the rights and obligations provided by the conventions into their national 
legal and policy frameworks (Ali, 2015). 
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Despite the relevance of the SUA Framework, especially in Nigeria where most of the 
attacks are in territorial waters and often against offshore platforms, the 2005 SUA 
Protocol is yet to be ratified by Nigeria. Therefore, for acts of piracy and armed robbery 
at sea, the UNCLOS, and the 1988 SUA Convention, and SUA Protocol are the 
international treaties Nigeria is bound to follow having ratified the UNCLOS in 1986 
(United Nations, 2017), the SUA Convention in 2004 and the SUA Protocol in 2015 
(IMO, 2017). 
In Nigeria, there is no any anti- piracy law that criminalizes piracy or armed robbery 
at sea and there is also no national law which specifically incorporates the provisions 
of UNCLOS and the SUA Convention and Protocol. There is a rather vague provision 
in Part XII of the Merchant Shipping Act Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (LFN) 
2007 (LFN, 2016) which deals with safety of life at sea (See Appendix 1). 
Article 216 (h) of the Merchant Shipping Act provides that “As from the 
commencement of this Act, the following Conventions, Protocol and their 
amendments relating to maritime safety shall apply that is; Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 1988 and the 
Protocol thereto.” 
Article 217 (1) of the Act further provides that ‘‘The Minister may make such 
regulations as he deems expedient for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the 
part of this Act.’’ 
The Merchant Shipping Act only provided that the 1988 SUA Convention and Protocol 
would apply to maritime safety, but it failed to provide for adequate punishment for 
offences under the Convention and the Protocol. It could be that the intention of the 
drafters of the Merchant Shipping Act was to give effect to the convention; however, 
mere mention of the instruments in the Act defeats the purpose for which the 
instruments were created.  As earlier mentioned in this research, the SUA framework 
identifies different unlawful acts at sea which can be prosecuted by states but it places 
an obligation on state parties to provide appropriate sentences for the offences in their 
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domestic laws. Mere mention of the SUA Convention and Protocol in the Merchant 
Shipping Act only means the offences are recognized but without punishment. 
Although there are no specific laws criminalizing piracy and armed robbery in Nigeria, 
there are some laws such as the Criminal Code Act and the Penal Code (LFN, 2016) 
that criminalize the constituent components of piracy and armed robbery at sea; 
however, they apply only to offences carried out in Nigeria’s territory and territorial 
waters. 
3.3 Regional Legal Framework 
Article 100 UNCLOS provides for two interrelated obligations in respect of piracy. 
The first obligation is for states to repress piracy at the national level. The second 
obligation is for states to cooperate in the repression of piracy at the regional and 
international levels. To give practical effect to the second obligation, there is a need to 
establish legal frameworks that would facilitate information sharing and strategies to 
combat piracy (Ali, 2015). The Economic Community for West African States 
(ECOWAS) Treaty of 1975 is the first legal framework adopted at the regional level 
to foster cooperation. The treaty was revised in 1992 to deepen the security objective 
and was further adopted in 1999, establishing peace and security mechanisms for 
ECOWAS (Ali, 2014). Article 58 of the ECOWAS revised treaty requires states to 
undertake to work, safeguard and consolidate relations conducive to maintain peace, 
stability and security in the region. As a result of this, Nigeria and Benin entered into 
a Bilateral Agreement, codename Operation Prosperity, concerning border 
management in 2011 and this bilateral agreement resulted in cooperation between 
security forces of both countries and led to joint anti-piracy patrols along their common 
sea borders (Blum, 2014). So far as piracy and armed robbery at sea are concerned, the 
only output from ECOWAS is the bilateral agreement between Nigeria and Benin. As 
a result of this, in 2013, the Heads of States and Government of ECOWAS directed 
the ECOWAS commission to facilitate and adopt an ECOWAS maritime strategy and 
to establish a Pilot Zone E, which will be a regional maritime framework to suppress 
piracy within the region (Onuoha, 2013). 
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The Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa (MOWCA) Memorandum of 
Understanding for the Establishment of Sub-Regional Integrated Coast Guard 
Network in West and Central Africa, MOWCA/XII GA.08/8.2008 referred to as the 
MOWCA Coastguard MOU is another regional legal framework available in the Gulf 
of Guinea (MOWCA, 2008). The MOU was aimed at using a unified administration 
to create a maritime law enforcement program and to create a regional maritime 
information sharing centre to help member states share and exchange security 
information (Ali, 2014). Article 12 of the MOU divides the coast guard network into 
zones. The MOU provides for a principal coordinator that is responsible for the 
management of the coast guard network and zonal coordinators responsible for the 
zones. Article 15 of the MOU established rules for operation of the coast guard asset 
and Article 21 requires states seeking the presence of ships in their zone to request 
‘‘useful justification’’ by the zonal coordinators that would approve the request and 
plan the mission (Ali, 2014). To date, the MOU is yet to gain full commitment in 
respect to the coast guard functions; however, it succeeded in ensuring that member 
states establish national Maritime Rescue Coordination Centres (MRCC) (Jacobsen & 
Nordby, 2015). 
The Treaty of the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) 2001 also provides a legal 
framework at the regional level. For maritime security issues, it is aimed at 
strengthening cooperation amongst member states and among other regional 
institutions. It is also aimed at creating conditions of mutual confidence, conducive to 
peace and security of states (GGC, 2017). 
In 2013, the Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery 
against Ships and Illicit Maritime Activity in the West and Central Africa (Yaoundé 
Code of conduct) was adopted and signed by 22 states in the region. The Yaoundé 
Code of conduct came into existence as a result of the United Nation Security Council 
Resolutions 2018 and 2039 which encouraged ECOWAS, the Economic Community 
for Central African States (ECCAS) and the GGC to develop a comprehensive regional 
strategy and framework to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships and other 
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illicit maritime activities through regional information sharing and strategic 
coordination mechanism. It was adopted to build on the MOU on integrated coast 
guard functions and it incorporates a number of elements of the Djibouti code of 
conduct, which is the regional counter-piracy agreement for East African states. The 
Yaoundé Code has a wider scope than the Djibouti code and it addresses a range of 
illicit activities at sea including piracy (IMO, 2017). To date, the code is yet to be 
implemented (Mosima, 2017). 
3.4 Institutional Framework 
Laws have force when there are enforcement mechanisms to achieve the purpose for 
which they are made. This means that the mere existence of legal instruments to 
combat acts of piracy cannot help in suppressing the offence. This section will examine 
the institutions available to combat piracy and armed robbery at sea at national and 
regional levels. 
3.4.1  National institutional frameworks 
The Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA), the Nigerian 
Navy, the Federal Ministry of Justice, the Nigeria Police Force (NPF), and the 
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) are the agencies responsible for 
law enforcement against piracy and armed robbery at sea in Nigeria. 
NIMASA is the maritime administration agency established by the Nigerian Maritime 
Administration and Safety Agency Act (2007). By virtue of the Act, one of the core 
functions of NIMASA is to implement domesticated international maritime 
conventions. With respect to piracy and armed robbery at sea, NIMASA’s role is to 
carry out air and coastal surveillance, search and rescue operations and to supervise 
general maritime logistic support for patrols against piracy and armed robbery in 
Nigerian coastal waters (NIMASA, 2017). 
The Nigerian Navy is the agency empowered by the Nigerian Constitution to protect 
the territorial waters of the state and to secure the state’s maritime zones. This policing 
role is spelt out in section 4 of the Armed Forces Act (AFA) CAP A20 LFN 2004, 
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which requires the Nigerian Navy to enforce, assist and coordinate the enforcement of 
national and international maritime laws ratified by Nigeria (AFA, 2004). 
Accordingly, the Nigerian Navy’s role against piratical acts is to make arrests of pirate 
vessels, suspected pirates and armed robbers at sea (Nigerian Navy, 2014). 
The NPF also has a department of marine police which has formations in areas where 
there are navigable rivers and waterways in Nigeria. The marine police department 
generally conducts security combats and anti-crime operations in territorial waters but 
focuses more on securing platforms (NPF, 2017). 
The Federal Ministry of Justice and the EFCC carry out public prosecution. While the 
main function of the Federal Ministry of Justice is to prosecute all types of criminal 
cases (Federal Ministry of Justice, 2017), the EFCC’s role is to prosecute economic 
and financial crimes (EFCC, 2017). In line with section 5(m) of the Economic and 
Financial Crimes Commission Act, the EFCC is responsible for ‘‘taking charge of, 
supervising, controlling, co-ordinating all the responsible functions and activities 
relating to the current investigation and prosecution of all offences connected with or 
relating to economic and financial crime.’’ Although piracy and armed robbery at sea 
are not specifically listed as offences under the Act, in practice, the EFCC handles 
cases of piracy and armed robbery at sea. 
3.4.2 Regional institutional frameworks 
In West Africa, the institutional frameworks created to strengthen maritime security 
and increase cooperation amongst states in the region are MOWCA, ECOWAS, GGC 
and ECCAS (Ali, 2015).  Most countries in West and Central African regions are 
members of these institutions and they commit to cooperating in the prevention of 
different maritime security threats, including piracy and armed robbery at sea (Otto, 
2014). Nigeria is a member of MOWCA, ECOWAS and GGC. 
MOWCA was established in 1975 and its major objective is to ‘‘serve the regional and 
international community for handling all maritime matters that are regional in 
character.’’ MOWCA has 25 member states and they form the member states of the 
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Gulf of Guinea region (Ali, 2015). MOWCA could be regarded as a regional maritime 
institution that establishes contacts and negotiates between private maritime sectors, 
national ports, maritime authorities and educational bodies (Jacobsen & Nordby, 
2015). 
ECOWAS was established in 1975 and it has 15 member states out of the 25 states in 
the Gulf of Guinea. ECOWAS was adopted mainly for economic cooperation amongst 
member states; however, its revised treaty expanded its political and security objective 
by establishing a peace and security mechanism (Ali, 2014). 
The GGC was established in 2001 with an objective to stand as “a permanent 
institutional framework for co-operation amongst the countries bordering the Gulf of 
Guinea in order to defend their common interest and promote peace and social 
economic development based on dialogue, consensus, ties of friendship, solidarity and 
fraternity’’ (GGC, 2017). The GGC is the only regional organization in the Gulf of 
Guinea that is entirely maritime and, for this reason, it has gained international 
attention as an organization that has the ability to enlist national regional and external 
assistance to develop a robust maritime security cooperation and enforcement 
framework regardless of the size of the organization (Ali, 2015). 
ECCAS is another regional institution serving the Gulf of Guinea region but Nigeria 
is not a member. It was established in 1983 but became operational in 1999 due to 
financial difficulties and interstate conflict in the region. In 2008, ECCAS developed 
an Integrated Strategy for Maritime Security (ISMS) which was aimed towards 
developing a common regional framework that would regulate maritime activities in 
Central Africa. It adopted a Protocol on Maritime Security (protocol on the peace and 
security council of central Africa (COPAX) in 2009 which laid down the structure of 
its maritime security cooperation. The Protocol set out a 3 tier security structure which 
is composed of regional, zonal and national coordinating centres (ECCAS ,2014).  Its 
Regional Centre for Maritime Security in Central Africa (CRESMAC) was activated 
due to the security structure and the CRESMAC was responsible for commanding 
three centres of multinational coordination. The aim of the CRESMAC was to bridge 
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the information sharing and authorization protocols required during hot pursuit of 
suspected vessels across maritime boundaries (Osinowo, 2015). ECCAS derived the 
legal and political authority as an institutional framework for cooperation by states 
within the region.
 
The international legal framework examined in this chapter provides the normative 
regime for responding to piracy and armed robbery at sea. the discussion identified 
certain gaps in the international legal framework but was able to demonstrate that the 
UNCLOS and SUA conventions complement each other to fill the gaps. Although it 
may be argued that the international frameworks do not provide sufficient solutions to 
piratical activities, they are capable of working successfully to ensure piracy and 
armed robbery are punished if implemented by states. 
In the fight against piracy, the utility of the international legal framework depends on 
its implementation in piracy affected regions. The usefulness of the international legal 
frameworks in Nigeria is limited due to its failure to implement the conventions. 
Failure to incorporate and implement the Conventions means inadequate laws to 
establish jurisdiction to prosecute the offence and inadequate laws to punish the 
offence. This also constitutes serious a impediment on the maritime law enforcement 
institutions in the performance of their roles. 
According to Ali (2015), one of the ways to minimize legal complexities is through 
commitment to regional and global cooperation. The discussion in this chapter showed 
that there are a number of regional institutions which Nigeria is part of. Despite their 
existence, their efforts so far have proved insufficient to deter piracy because of certain 
limitations. Some of these limitations include differences in cooperative agenda, 
sovereignty limitations, financial limitations, and internal politics in the organization. 
Since the majority of piratical attacks occur within territorial waters, the logical 
response to the threat would be to strengthen law enforcement and enhance 
cooperation between the regional organizations. The next chapter will, therefore, look 
into the challenges of combating piracy in Nigeria with a view to proffering solutions.  
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4 CHALLENGES OF COMBATTING PIRACY IN NIGERIA 
The purpose of this chapter is to pinpoint the areas where there are gaps that limit the 
fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea, and to identify the major challenges 
causing the gaps. To achieve this, this chapter will give details of international reports 
on piracy and armed robbery against ships in Nigeria and in the Gulf of Guinea region, 
followed by records from Nigerian law enforcement agencies which show statistics of 
law enforcement measures. It will further analyse the contemporary challenges of 
combatting piracy and armed robbery at sea in Nigeria. The period covered by this 
study will be from 2013 to 2016 because in this period, Nigeria recorded the highest 
number of attacks in Africa. 
4.1 Records of Piratical Activities in Nigeria from 2013-2016 
The aim of this section is to show the rising level of piracy and armed robbery attacks 
against ships navigating through Nigerian maritime zones, to show the enforcement 
measures by the relevant agencies and to identify the areas where there are gaps in the 
enforcement measures. 
4.1.1 Reports from international organizations  
The International Maritime Organization is a specialized agency of the UN responsible 
for maritime safety, maritime security, facilitation of international maritime transport 
and protection of the marine environment. The IMO receives reports of actual and 
attempted attacks of piracy and armed robbery at sea from member states and relevant 
regional international organizations and it provides incident reports monthly and 
annually through its Global Integrated Shipping Information System (GISIS) (IMO, 
2017). Table 1 below, which was adapted from IMO monthly and annual reports on 
piracy and armed Robbery against ships, shows that from 2013 to 2016, Nigeria 
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recorded a substantial number of attacks and attempted attacks when compared to the 
total global attacks in each year. 
Table 1: IMO incident report on actual and attempted piracy attacks  
INCIDENT REPORTS 2013 2014 2015 2016 
IMO Annual report for West Africa 
on attacks and attempted attacks 
 
54 
 
45 
 
35 
 
62 
Annual reported attacks and 
attempted attacks in Nigeria 
 
28 
 
20 
 
11 
 
32 
Source: Adapted from (IMO, 2017)  
 
The ICC IMB piracy reporting centre is another international forum which provides 
transparent statistics on piracy and armed robbery attacks. The Piracy Reporting 
Centre was established in 1992 to act as a single point of contact for shipmasters to 
report piracy and armed robbery attacks or suspected attacks anywhere in the world. 
Usually, as soon as the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre receives information from the 
shipmasters, it relays the information to the local law enforcement agencies for 
assistance to be rendered to the vessel, and then broadcasts the information to all 
vessels in the region to create awareness (IMB Piracy Reporting Centre, 2017). The 
information reported by shipmasters on piracy and armed robbery attacks is collated 
and published annually by the IMB. Table 2 shows actual and attempted piracy and 
armed robbery attacks in Nigeria. 
Table 2: IMB report on actual and attempted piracy attacks  
LOCATION 2013 2014 2015 2016 
NIGERIA 31 18 
 
14 36 
Source: Adapted from (IMB Piracy reporting Centre, 2017). 
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PHILIPPINES, 10
PERU, 11
INDIA, 14
INDONESIA, 49
NIGERIA, 36
The IMB annual report of 2016 also shows an increased number of piratical attacks in 
Nigeria. In the report, the pirates and armed robbers were described to be fully armed 
and violent, famous for robbing and hijacking vessels, and sometimes kidnapping the 
crew (ICC IMB, 2017). Figure 2 shows recent IMB statistics on five countries which 
account for 63% of the total global reported piracy attacks and attempted attacks in 
2016
Figure 2: Top five piracy locations in 2016  
  
 
 
   
   
 
Source: Adapted from (IMB Piracy reporting Centre, 2017). 
 
Whereas the statistics from the IMO or IMB may not be totally accurate, as there have 
been known cases of under reporting of less serious attacks for a variety of reasons, 
they are a useful indicator of general trends (Trelawny, 2013). From the above tables 
and chart, it is clear that reported cases of piratical attacks in Nigeria increased in 2016. 
A study of the statistics reveals some interesting facts. For example, the number of 
piratical attacks, both actual and attempted, dropped in 2014 and 2015. Compared to 
2016, Nigeria reported 36 attacks out of 191 reported attacks representing 
approximately 19% of the total global reported attacks in 2016.
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4.1.2 Reports from law enforcement agencies in Nigeria 
This section shows reports of piracy and armed robbery from law enforcement 
agencies in Nigeria according to their specific roles highlighted in chapter three of this 
research.
Table 3: NIMASA report on piracy distress calls  
S/N YEAR PIRACY 
ATTACK 
SEA 
ROBBERY 
ATTEMPTED 
ATTACK 
SUSPICIOUS 
ATTACK 
TOTAL 
ATTACK 
1. 2013 81 10 16 5 112 
2. 2014 11 1 5  17 
3. 2015 10  3  13 
4. 2016 8  1 1 10 
Source: Adapted from (Ibraheemarfo@gmail.com, Personal communication, May 26, 
2017).
Table 3 was generated from NIMASA records on distress calls received from ships. 
The full report which is attached in Appendix 2 did not capture the actual actions taken 
by NIMASA with respect to their support patrol and search and rescue duties, but it 
showed a declining number of distress calls to NIMASA on piracy and armed robbery 
attacks from 2013 to 2016. The figures from NIMASA, however, do not tally with 
those of the Nigerian Navy shown in Table 4.
Table 4: Nigerian Navy report on piracy attacks and attempted attacks 
S/N YEAR CARGO 
VESSEL 
TANKER 
VESSEL 
OTHER 
VESSEL 
TOTAL 
ATTACKS 
SUSPECTED PERSONS 
ARRESTED FOR 
PIRACY AND ARMED 
ROBBERY 
1 2013      -         -        -      - 26 
2. 2014    3   16   8      27 24 
3. 2015    3   12   2      17 26 
4. 2016   16   37   25      78 11 
5.    TOTAL 
 
    122 87 
Source: Adapted from (Apache58us@yahoo.com, Personal communication, June 17, 
2017).
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Table 4 was generated from the Nigerian Navy operations records. See Appendix 3 – 
6 of this research for the full report which shows the list of attacks on vessels in 
Nigerian waters from 2014 to 2016 and the list of vessels and crew arrested for piracy 
and armed robbery. The report shows that in 2016 the Nigerian Navy recorded a higher 
number of attacks than that recorded by the IMB piracy reporting centre. Moreover, 
the reports highlighted a total number of 122 attacks from 2013 to 2016 and, in same 
period, a total of 87 persons were arrested and handed over for prosecution. 
From the Nigerian Navy record of attacks in 2016, it becomes evident that the Nigerian 
Navy received direct calls for assistance from vessels under attack, but the majority of 
the calls received were not reported to the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre.
 
Table 5: Piracy cases prosecuted by the Nigerian Federal Ministry of Justice and 
EFCC 
S/N YEAR  NUMBER OF 
SUSPECT 
BROUGHT TO 
COURT 
CONVICTIONS DISCHARGED 
AND 
ACQUITTED 
ONGOING 
CASES 
1. 2013 3 2 - 1 
2. 2014 - - - - 
3. 2015 6 2 1 3  
4. 2016 4 3 - 1 
  Total - 13    
Source: Adapted from (Kehinde, Personal communication, May 25, 2017)
Table 5, which shows piracy cases handled by prosecuting agencies in Nigeria, was 
received from the Department of Public Prosecution, a unit in the Nigerian Federal 
Ministry of Justice. The record shows a total number of 13 cases handled from 2013 
to2016, with three convictions and one discharge and acquittal of arrested persons. 
Compared to the number of handovers made by the arresting agency, the cases that 
were successfully brought before the court are surprisingly very low.
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4.2 Gaps in the Law Enforcement Measures 
From the records provided in section 4.1.2 above, certain gaps are visible when the 
figures provided by the law enforcement agencies are analysed. The first gap is lack 
of cooperation and poor information sharing between law enforcement agencies. In 
2007, NIMASA and the Nigerian Navy entered into a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) to enable the two agencies to cooperate in securing the country’s maritime 
domain. The MOU created an avenue for both agencies to collaborate on surveillance 
of the coastal waters, information sharing, search and rescue operations and sea-based 
enforcement actions against piracy, armed robbery and other maritime offences 
(NIMASA, 2017). This MOU gave rise to the use of the Nigerian Navy satellite 
surveillance system (FALCON EYE) by NIMASA to enhanced information sharing 
and reduce response time (Kajo, 2016). Considering the collaboration between the two 
agencies, it is expected that there would be an enhanced information sharing system 
between the agencies; however, this is not the case. To have different records on 
piratical activities shows that there is a gap in the information sharing system and in 
cooperation between the agencies. 
The records on piracy and armed robbery at sea by the Nigerian Navy, attached as 
Appendix 3-6 of this research, show a high number of successful attacks by pirates 
and sea robbers within and outside the territorial waters of Nigeria, in which some of 
the crew or passengers were killed or taken hostage before the attacked vessels were 
secured by the law enforcement agency. There is an obvious gap in the response time 
to repel piracy attacks on vessels by the Nigerian Navy and NIMASA. 
The prosecuting agencies are not left out. While records show a number of 87 arrested 
persons suspected of piracy and armed robbery attacks, only 13 persons made it to 
court. When compared to the number of arrests made by the Nigerian Navy, the actual 
number of piracy or armed robbery cases brought to court is very low. This is an 
indication that there is a gap or some gaps that hinder the prosecuting agencies from 
charging in court every person arrested for suspected piracy or armed robbery at sea.
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4.3 Challenges Hindering Effective Law Enforcement against Piracy and 
Armed Robbery at Sea in Nigeria 
Efforts to repress piracy are generally hindered by a number of factors which could be 
legal, economic, financial or political challenges at national and regional levels. In 
Nigeria, the challenges are numerous and they create gaps in law enforcement 
measures. This section, therefore, seeks to examine the challenges of combating piracy 
in Nigeria and off its coast. 
4.3.1 Domestication of international laws 
Despite the codification of universal jurisdiction and the push for regional cooperation 
to combat piracy, customary international law still requires domestic legislation to 
prosecute the crime (Chang, 2010). In Nigeria, the mode for domestication of 
international treaties is provided for in the constitution. Section 12(1) of the 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 provides that; ‘‘No treaty 
between the federation and other country shall have the force of law except to the 
extent to which any such treaty has been enacted into law by the National Assembly.’’ 
In other words, before any treaty such as the UNCLOS and SUA conventions can have 
the force of law in Nigeria, the Nigerian National Assembly must enact the treaty into 
law. As earlier mentioned in this research, Nigeria has yet to domesticate these 
conventions into national law. Since the conventions are not domesticated, they cannot 
be used in the prosecution of cases involving piracy and armed robbery at sea before 
any court of law in Nigeria, nor can violators of the conventions be held accountable 
for any breach (Rotimi, 2016). Due to the legislative deficit, even though Nigeria may 
be able to conduct patrols and make arrests of suspected persons, the efficacy of its 
enforcement procedure is seriously undermined by the absence of domestic legislation 
to prosecute the offence of piracy and armed robbery at sea (see page 21). 
In some cases, the prosecuting agency finds it difficult to charge the suspected pirates 
in court because there is no appropriate offence under the national law to charge the 
persons involved. This is likely to result in catch and release situations, thereby giving 
a free pass to the suspected persons to continue their acts (Ali 2015). 
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From the above points, it could be concluded that the inability of Nigeria to enact 
specific laws on piracy and armed robbery at sea is a contributing factor to the limited 
number of piracy related trials in national courts. Situations whereby suspected pirates 
are released without trial may have little deterrent effect on other potential pirates and 
this has an effect on law enforcement agencies’ power to effectively combat the 
offence. 
4.3.2 Enforcement capacity 
For effective law enforcement against piratical activities, there needs to be a robust 
capacity with respect to surveillance, response and enforcement (Osinowo, 2015). In 
Nigeria, surveillance has improved tremendously due to the existence of the FALCON 
EYE surveillance system which monitors the Nigerian maritime zones up to 200nm 
(Wertheim, 2017). However, the vessels available for use by the Nigerian Navy and 
NIMASA for patrols and rescue duties are inadequate (Salau, 2017). This has a major 
effect on response time to distress calls on piracy attacks and also on other enforcement 
measures such as in situations of hot pursuit of a vessel involved in piracy. From 
personal experience, the usual trend when there is hot pursuit of such pirate vessels is 
for the vessels to be navigated into creeks and areas where most Nigerian navy vessels 
cannot navigate. The Nigerian Navy finds it very difficult to navigate into such creeks 
because the vessels it deploys for the operations are not built for such waters. Most 
times, local pilots are employed for patrol operations to ensure the vessels are 
navigated through the right channels. 
Another issue related to inadequate law enforcement capacity that hinders the fight 
against piracy is a lack of skilled personnel. While arrest of persons involved in piracy 
activities is one aspect of law enforcement, the judicial process is another aspect. 
Therefore, to successfully prosecute an arrested person, there must be admissible 
evidence against the person charged before the court. Most often, the preservation of 
evidence by the arresting agency before handover to the prosecuting agency is a 
problem. During the period of investigations before handover, there is usually the 
 36 
 
 
challenge of preservation of evidence which weighs in favour of the arrested persons, 
who in turn use it as grounds to gain freedom (Osinowo, 2015).
4.3.3 Lack of power to prosecute 
In Nigeria, the Navy relies on the EFCC and the Ministry of Justice to prosecute 
persons arrested on suspicion of piracy and armed robbery at sea because it lacks the 
power to prosecute such persons. This is a major obstacle in the fight against piracy 
and armed robbery at sea, especially in respect of availability of judicial officials. An 
example is the case of the Niger Delta area where trials of the arrested persons come 
several months after the arrest due to insufficient availability of judicial officers. As a 
result of the wait time, the suspected persons institute numerous cases of human rights 
breaches in courts because they were in detention longer than the required period 
provided by law. This usually weighs in favour of the suspected persons, who regain 
freedom soon after arrest (Osinowo, 2015). 
4.3.4 Corruption 
Another challenge that hinders law enforcement against piracy and armed robbery at 
sea in Nigeria is corruption of security operatives and government officials. There have 
been allegations of law enforcement officials collaborating with pirates and some 
arrested pirates have revealed that politicians, traditional rulers and corporate interest 
groups are sponsors of piracy in Nigeria. Hence, most of the pirate kingpins who are 
known to security operatives are untouchable by the law and even when they are 
arrested, they are usually released based on orders from top government officials 
(Oyewole, 2016).  From 2012 to 2013, the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP) and the Maritime Anti-Corruption Network (MACN) conducted a risk 
assessment study in the Nigeria Port sector. The study found that corruption is widely 
rationalized as part of the system and is an accepted tool to promote business interest. 
It was also found that superior officials at the port put pressure on their subordinates 
to comply with established corrupt practices (MACN, 2014). With such corrupt 
practices amongst government officials who hold discretionary powers in Nigerian 
 37 
 
 
ports, it becomes easy for pirates to enhance their networks within the system to access 
information on vessels navigating to and from the ports. 
4.3.5 Commercialization of anti-piracy measures  
In response to increased piracy in the Gulf of Guinea region, the innovative and 
collaborative approaches adopted by states over the years have not been totally 
sufficient and this is evidenced by the rising number of attacks in the region. This has 
made private military security an attractive option for shipping companies whose 
vessels ply the route. In some countries, shipping companies engage Private Military 
Security Companies (PMSC) to either deploy armed guards on board their ships, or to 
deploy an armed convoy escort vessel to guard the ship through piracy prone areas. In 
such situations, the ship owners are required to comply with flag state and port state 
regulations on transport and carriage of weapons (Dutton, 2013). 
Nigeria is opposed to the use of armed guards on board vessels within its territorial 
waters. PMSCs, Nigerian maritime security agencies and foreign ships navigating into 
Nigerian waters are subject to this restriction (Osler, 2014). Although armed guards 
are not allowed on board vessels in Nigerian waters, PMSCs have certain arrangements 
with the Nigerian government. Several companies operate escort vessels in 
cooperation with the Nigerian Navy. The vessels are owned and operated by the 
PMSCs but part of the crew during operations is provided by the Nigerian Navy. In 
addition, the naval detachment is solely responsible for weapon handling and 
operational command (Ocean Beyond Piracy, 2017). 
One of the contributing factors to Nigeria’s position is the challenge associated with 
the use of armed guards on board vessels. There has been a case where Nigerian Navy 
personnel accompanying a commercial vessel were killed by pirates and the crew taken 
hostage (Anyimadu, 2013). There was also a case where Nigerian police deployed as 
armed guards on board a commercial vessel (HISTRIA CORAL) fired at the Nigerian 
Navy’s boarding party vessel which was approaching the HISTRIA CORAL for 
inspection (Steffen, 2015). 
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Another factor that has necessitated Nigeria maintaining its position on armed guards 
is based on territorial sovereignty and concerns about unregistered weapons being 
brought into the country (Anyimadu, 2013). The use of unregistered weapons by armed 
guards on board vessels in the past have led to illegal activities such as gun trafficking. 
Considering the fact that Niger Delta pirates are known to have sophisticated weapons, 
which they obtain illegally, Nigeria is faced with the added task of arresting vessels 
with armed guards. The case of MV Myre Seadiver is illustrative of Nigeria’s measures 
against a PMSC that goes against its rules on armed guards. The MV Myre Seadiver 
and its crew were arrested by the Nigerian Navy in 2012 for illegally entering Nigerian 
waters carrying weapons. The ship owners claimed the vessel had a licence from the 
Nigerian authorities to carry weapons, but the claim was rejected. The crew were 
charged with illegal possession and importation of arms and ammunition (Anyimadu, 
2013). 
4.3.6 Limited inter-agency cooperation 
The proliferation of agencies in the maritime sector of Nigeria has, rather than solve 
the problems, created more. The law establishing some of these agencies often times 
does not clearly delineate their respective duties and functions to the effect that same 
or similar functions are given to each agency. This scenario has brought about a culture 
of unspoken but real inter-agency rivalry, with some agencies, in a bid to exert 
influence, claim credit or show relevance, engaging in all kinds of practices to 
outsmart, discredit and even sabotage others (Odoma & Aerinto, 2013). 
4.3.7 Maritime boundary dispute 
The effective countering of piracy requires cooperation between states; however, one 
major obstacle that impedes interstate cooperation is the concern over sovereignty 
(Murphy, 2010). Cooperation is likely to be jeopardized if a state identifies another 
state as a threat to its national interest and sovereignty. One such sovereignty concern 
that makes cooperative initiatives difficult to implement is Maritime boundary dispute 
(Ali, 2015) and when it exists between states, it bridges the relationship between the 
government of the states and hinders interstate cooperation to fight piracy and armed 
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robbery at sea. Examples of maritime disputes between states in the Gulf of Guinea 
region include: Nigeria and Cameroon dispute over the Bakassi Peninsula; Ghana and 
Ivory Coast dispute over oil rich waters, Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon dispute over 
an island at the mouth of the Ntem river and Gabon and Equatorial Guinea over Mbone 
Island and Corisco Bay (Mandanda & Ping, 2016). 
Until recently, when the Cameroonian navy made an effort to foster collaborations 
with the Nigerian navy, the maritime dispute between the two countries over the 
Bakassi Peninsula had hindered effective governance and security presence in the 
Bakassi Peninsula (Affe, 2017). In 2002, when the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
gave its judgment in favour of Cameroon, a majority of the indigenes were disgruntled 
about the decision because they believed that they ought to have been consulted by the 
ICJ before it declared the Bakassi Peninsula as Cameroon’s Territory. For this reason, 
they decided to break away from Nigeria and Cameroon in order to form their own 
nation. Some of the indigenes who later became the Bakassi Freedom Fighters tried to 
make their voices heard through involvement in terrorist acts, hostage taking and 
piracy at sea. The pirates who were known as the African Marine Commando, in 
collaboration with the MEND, were involved in constant attacks of vessels and kidnap 
of crew (Funteh, 2015). 
4.3.8 Poor inter-state cooperation 
The differences in culture of states within the Gulf of Guinea region hinder cooperation 
between states. This view is premised on the fact that the countries in the region speak 
different languages, and have different approaches to governance. Moreover, their 
navies have different equipment and different standard operating procedures. For these 
reasons, some of the navies withhold certain information that could be helpful in the 
fight against piracy, hindering information sharing which is key for effective 
cooperation amongst states within the region (Mandanda & Ping, 2016). 
The analysis in this chapter demonstrated that piracy in Nigeria is increasing due to 
inadequate law enforcement. The chapter revealed that the identified challenges are 
responsible for the poor law enforcement measures. From the analysis in this chapter, 
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it is obvious that the challenges create gaps in law enforcement which make it easy for 
piracy and armed robbery at sea to flourish in Nigeria. Having identified the challenges 
hindering effective law enforcement, it becomes necessary to determine the way 
forward to enhance enforcement measures both at the national and regional level. In 
the next chapter, the findings in this research are discussed and summarized in order 
to connect the dots of the research and suggest the way forward. 
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5 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS  
The research aimed to identify the challenges of combating piracy in Nigeria. It 
identified the challenges by examining the nature and trends of piracy and armed 
robbery at sea with particular focus on Somalia, the Gulf of Guinea and Nigeria. It 
examined the causes of piracy in Nigeria and found that most of the causes have roots 
onshore due to widespread poverty, unemployment, corruption, politics, culture, weak 
law enforcement capacity and constant conflict between government and ethnic 
groups. The research further analysed the substance of the legal context for piracy in 
international law and identified the legal and institutional frameworks at the national 
and regional levels. It provided data on enforcement measures at the national level and 
identified gaps. The challenges identified are classified into legal and operational. 
5.1 Legal Challenges 
The research revealed that international law on piracy and armed robbery at sea 
requires states to criminalize and punish piracy in national legislation, but Nigeria has 
failed to implement the UNCLOS and SUA frameworks. Nigeria incorporated the 
1988 SUA frameworks in its Merchant Shipping Act but the Act does not conform to 
the requirements of the SUA Convention. It was also revealed that Nigeria is yet to 
ratify the 2005 SUA Protocols which are very important for attacks against platforms, 
a common type of piracy attack in Nigeria. 
It was further revealed that, of all the regional legal frameworks on piracy in the Gulf 
of Guinea, the Yaoundé Code of Conduct is the only framework that provides a 
comprehensive strategy to combat piracy in the Gulf of Guinea region. Though the 
code has been adopted and signed, it has yet to be implemented. 
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5.2 Operational Challenges  
The research revealed that platforms for enforcement measures are inadequate. This 
being the case, it becomes difficult for law enforcement agencies to ensure quick 
response to distress calls; hence, pirates succeed in their attacks before help is rendered 
to the vessel in distress. 
The lack of skilled personnel was also addressed and this revealed that law 
enforcement officers lack technical know-how which affects their ability to preserve 
evidence. This usually weighs in favour of arrested pirates who use it as grounds to 
gain freedom.  
It was found that the existence of corruption in Nigeria hinders enforcement measures 
and it helps pirates develop their networks. The corruption in the system makes most 
of the pirates confident that, even though they are arrested, it may not take long before 
they are released because they have connections in high places. 
Another issue addressed was prosecution of pirates. The number of persons prosecuted 
after arrest is few because agencies responsible for arrest lack the power to prosecute. 
It was found that the Nigerian Navy and NIMASA do not have the power to prosecute 
pirates. After investigations, the pirates are handed over to the prosecuting agency and 
in some regions there are delays in prosecution because of unavailability of prosecutors 
which often leads to release of pirates either by court order on human rights claims or 
on constitutional grounds. It was revealed that the establishment of new maritime 
agencies in Nigeria with similar roles hinders inter agency cooperation in the fight 
against piracy. 
Further examination of regional institutions revealed that there are four platforms 
serving the Gulf of Guinea region and the platforms have different cooperation 
agendas. The research revealed that that MOWCA failed to achieve its coast guard 
MOU because states are unwilling to commit to the agreement on grounds of 
sovereignty issues. ECOWAS failed to establish a maritime security cooperation 
strategy and its only output is the bilateral agreement between Nigeria and Benin. The 
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research revealed that while the GGC commands great recognition and could be the 
organization to develop a robust maritime security cooperation and enforcement 
framework, it has so far been unable to achieve its objectives. On the other hand, 
ECCAS has been able to provide a functional maritime security framework but Nigeria 
is not a member of the organization. In summary, the research showed that the 
conflicting approaches of the institutions undermine the main objective of regional 
cooperation and this impacts on cooperation between states in the region. 
5.3 Nigeria Effort to Combat Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea  
At the national level, one of the first measures adopted to repress piracy and armed 
robbery at sea was the initiative to curb militancy. Militancy was a major source of 
piracy in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. For this reason, Nigeria introduced an 
amnesty programme which provided opportunity for the militants to surrender. The 
initiative was successful and many militants responsible for piracy attacks within the 
region surrendered their arms (Matthew, 2012).  
Following the amnesty programme, the Nigerian government in 2012 transformed its 
military Joint Task Force (Operation Restore Hope) into an expanded maritime 
security force (Operation Pulo Shield). The Joint Task Force, which was initially 
established to combat militancy in the Niger Delta, was then mandated to eliminate 
piracy, all forms of sea robbery and other maritime offences (Onuoha, 2013).  
Nigeria has also been involved in the acquisition of patrol vessels and the improvement 
of its surveillance systems. In 2016, the Nigerian Navy launched a new surveillance 
system known as “FALCON EYE” which was aimed towards providing enhanced 
maritime domain awareness and surveillance capabilities to combat piracy and other 
maritime offences (Wertheim, 2017).  
In addition to the FALCON EYE system, the Nigerian Navy has also adopted a new 
choke point strategy to combat piracy and armed robbery at sea. The strategy involves 
stationing house boats in various creeks and estuaries for easy patrolling (Ezeobi, 
2016). 
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Similarly, NIMASA entered into a memorandum of understanding with the Nigerian 
Air Force for the use of locally produced Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) for air 
surveillance of Nigerian coastal waters (Kajo, 2016). 
NIMASA has also made effort to ensure that the relevant international conventions on 
piracy and armed robbery at sea are implemented. Recently, NIMASA forwarded a 
new anti-piracy Bill to the Nigerian Ministry of Justice for presentation as an executive 
Bill to the National Assembly (Nwanchukwu, 2017). If the Bill is passed into law, it 
will help remedy the legislative gap that hinders law enforcement against piracy and 
armed robbery at sea. 
Recently, Nigeria established a Harmonized Standard Operating Procedure (HSOP) 
on arrest, detention and prosecution of vessels and persons in its maritime environment 
(See Appendix 6). The HSOP is designed to guide the operations of maritime law 
enforcement agencies, solve the problem of overlapping functions and inter agency 
rivalry, and to promote inter agency cooperation (Azu, 2017). 
The fight against piracy is difficult when conducted solely by an individual state. This 
is premised on the fact that persons involved in acts of piracy may commit the act in 
the territorial waters of one state and then navigate to another state’s territorial waters 
to escape arrest. Therefore, even though effort is made to combat piracy at the national 
level, it might not be easy to effectively combat the offence when the neighbouring 
state’s effort to combat the offence is weak, hence the need for joint forces and 
strategies between Nigeria and neighbouring states (Madanda & Ping, 2016). In this 
regard, Nigeria has shown efforts in repressing piracy and armed robbery at the 
regional level. Its participation in the bilateral agreement for joint patrol across 
maritime borders with Benin and its participation in the various regional institutions 
highlighted in chapter three of this research is evidence of its effort to repress the 
offences not just within its territorial waters but also in the waters off its coast.  
Nigeria has also made efforts to improve its law enforcement capacity to ensure the 
safety and security of shipping by collaborating with the United States and 
participating in the regional exercise (Exercise Obangame) conducted by the United 
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States African Command, which is aimed towards improving cooperation between 
participating nations and improving their law enforcement capacity (United States 
African Command, nd). 
5.4 The Way Forward 
Although Nigeria has made efforts to combat piracy and armed robbery at sea, there is 
need to do more. The way forward to remedy the challenges of combating piracy in 
Nigeria would be to: 
a. Improve the legal and operational measures currently in place to combat piracy 
b. To improve cooperation between the regional institutions.  
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6 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The first conclusion drawn from this research is that Nigeria’s delay in the 
implementation of the UNCLOS, SUA Convention and SUA Protocol has the most 
significant effect on law enforcement. This conclusion is validated by the findings in 
chapters three, four and five. The analysis in chapter three has shown the extent to 
which the international legal framework can help solve the problems of piracy and 
armed robbery at sea. The chapter identified the gaps in the international legal 
frameworks but concluded that, although the UNCLOS may be inapplicable to certain 
piracy attacks the SUA Convention and Protocols are available to remedy most of the 
gaps. Therefore, the Conventions when implemented, can to a large extent, solve the 
piracy problem in Nigeria. The chapter further assessed the extent to which Nigeria 
has ratified and implemented the conventions. The conclusion reached was that 
Nigeria has ratified UNCLOS, the SUA Convention and the SUA protocol of 1988 but 
has failed to implement the conventions. It also found that Nigeria has yet to ratify the 
2005 SUA Protocols which, if ratified, would be very relevant in combating piracy 
and armed robbery at sea in Nigeria because of the nature of attacks that exist within 
its territorial waters and in the Gulf of Guinea.  Analysis in chapter four further 
revealed that Nigeria practices a dualistic legal system; hence, mere ratification is not 
automatic implementation of the convention. Thus, ratification without 
implementation creates a situation of catch and release. Chapter five also revealed the 
efforts Nigeria has made so far to combat piracy and recent efforts show that there 
have been some improvements in enforcement capacity Chapter five shows that 
Nigeria had acquired some platforms, improved its surveillance system, established a 
harmonized standard operating procedure for maritime law enforcement agencies and 
is currently participating in capacity building of law enforcement personnel. While 
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these efforts had been made, the process for the enactment of anti-piracy law just 
commenced. It follows, therefore, that the efficacy of surveillance, patrols and arrest 
had been seriously undermined due the absence of domestic legislation to prosecute 
and punish persons arrested. The findings in this research support the conclusion that 
delay in the enactment of anti-piracy laws in Nigeria has the most significant effect on 
maritime law enforcement against piracy and armed robbery at sea. 
The second conclusion drawn from this research is that Regional Institutional 
frameworks lack coordination and have failed to ensure cooperation between the Gulf 
of Guinea states. This conclusion is validated by the analysis in chapter three which 
showed that there are four regional institutions concurrently serving the Gulf of Guinea 
region to ensure maritime security cooperation. The analysis revealed that the 
institutions are at different stages of development with the ECCAS framework being 
the most established. The institutions, particularly the GGC and ECCAS have different 
cooperation agendas regardless of the fact that all members of the GGC except Nigeria 
are also members of ECCAS. This creates a conflicting approach to cooperation 
between states and undermines the process of maritime security cooperation. The 
analysis in chapter three suggests that the regional institution is an avenue for 
establishing closer relations between the Gulf of Guinea states and for enhancing 
maritime security within the region. This is, however, not being manifested as chapter 
four revealed the limited information sharing between states due to certain cultural 
differences, sovereignty issues, military confidentiality rules, and differences in 
operation procedures of the navies. These points support the conclusion that the 
regional institutions lack coordination and have failed to ensure cooperation between 
states in the Gulf of Guinea. 
The last conclusion drawn from this research is that piracy can be reduced if land based 
problems are addressed. This conclusion is supported by chapter two. Chapter two 
described the nature of piracy in Nigeria and highlighted the causes. The causes 
highlighted point toward the fact that the crime is accepted as a normal way of life and 
is being perceived as a career option because of the economic situation of the country. 
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Chapter four also highlighted some challenges that hinders law enforcement against 
piracy and armed robbery at sea and most of the identified challenges are land based. 
Although Nigeria has made efforts to ensure effective law enforcement against piracy 
and armed robbery at sea, the efforts are not effective enough. Nigeria need to improve 
its law enforcement capacity, improve governance and put more efforts into solving 
land based problems such as corruption, unemployment and poverty. Improving the 
economic situation in Nigeria may be difficult to achieve in a short time due to certain 
political, financial and economic constraints, in the long run, it would help reduce acts 
of piracy in Nigeria and in the Gulf of Guinea.  
At the regional level, cooperation between states could be achieved if the Gulf of 
Guinea states can agree on which platform would be solely responsible for the 
development and implementation of cooperation strategies that would ensure national 
and international participation. The platform would therefore be responsible for the 
implementation of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct to improve cooperation between the 
Gulf of Guinea states and develop a regional strategy that would combat the growing 
threat.  
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APPENDIX 1 
MERCHANT SHIPPING ACT 
ARRANGMENT OF SECTIONS 
 
PART I: Administration of the 
Act 
 
1. Administration of Act and 
delegation of powers. 
 
2. Agency for Maritime Safety 
Administration. 
 
3. Returns as to merchant shipping, 
etc., to the Minister. 
 
4. Appointment of officers. 
 
PART II: Restriction on 
Trading in Nigeria 5. Certificate 
of licence required by all ships 
trading in Nigeria. 
National Character of Ships 
 
6. Need to show colours. 
 
7. National character of ships to be 
declared before clearance. 
Certificates 
227. Issue of certificates of survey 
228. Issue of safety certificates to 
passengers ships, e.t.c 
229. Issue to cargo ships of safety 
equipment and exemption 
certificates 
230. Issue to cargo ships of radio 
certificates and exem certificates 
231. Issue of general safety 
certificates, etc., on partial 
compliance with rules 
232. Transmission of certificates. 
Modification of provisions for exemption of 
ships 
233. Notice of alterations and additional 
surveys 
234. Certificate to be posted on board 
235. Prohibition on 
proceeding to sea 
without appropriate 
certificates. 
236. Modification of Safety Convention 
certificates in 
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211. Documents to be handed over 
to successor on change of 
master. 
 
 
Miscellaneous 
212. Minister may dispense with 
transaction before 
superintendent. 
213. Deposit of documents at overseas 
port. 
214. Conflict of laws. 
215. Application to unregistered ships. 
 
PART XII: Safety of Life at Sea 
 
General Provisions 
 
216. Application of some 
related maritime safety 
Conventions and Protocols. 
 
217. Regulations. 
218. Breach of safety regulations. 
 
Survey of Ships 
219. Surveyors of ships. 
220. Ships to be surveyed annually. 
221. Surveyor's record of inspections 
and certificates. 
433.  Board of Survey. 
 
Scientific Referees 434. Reference in 
difficult cases to scientific persons. 
PART XXX: Subsidiary Legislation 
 
435. General power to make regulations. 
 
436. General power of exemption. 
 
437. Applicable Conventions, etc. 
 
438. Penalty in subsidiary legislation. 
 
439. Applied legislation. 
 
 
PART XXXI: Repeals and 
Transition 
 
Repeals, etc. 
 
440. Repeal of Cap. 224 L.F.N. 1990. 
441. Consequential amendments. 
442. Contravention of International 
Conventions. 
 
Transitional Provisions 
 
443. The Schedules. 
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PART XII 
 
APPLICATION OF SOME RELATED MARITIME SAFETYCONVENTIONS 
AND PROTOCOLS 
216 As from the commencement of this Act, the following Conventions, 
Protocols and their amendments relating to maritime safety shall apply, that is- 
 
(a) International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS); 
(b) Protocol relating to the International Convention for the Safety of Life 
at Sea, 1988 and Annexes I to V thereto; 
(c) International Convention on Standards of Training Certification and 
Watch Keeping of Seafarers, 1978 (STCW) as amended; 
(d) International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, 1979 (SAR); 
(e) International Labour Organisation Convention (No. 32 of 1932) on 
Protection against Accident of Workers Employed in Loading or 
Unloading Ships (Dockers Convention Revised 1932); 
(f) International Convention on Maritime Satellite Organisation, 1976 (INMAR- 
SA T) and the Protocol thereto; 
(g) the Athens Convention relating to the Carriage of Passengers and 
their Luggage by Sea, 1974 and its Protocol of 1990; 
(h) Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation, 1988 and the Protocol thereto; 
(i) International Convention on Salvage, 1989; 
 
(j) Placing of Seamen Convention, 1920; 
(k) International Ship and Ports Facility Security (ISPS) Code; and 
 
(l) International Convention for Safe Containers, 1972. 
 
217 REGULATIONS 
 (1)   The minister may make such regulations as he deems necessary or expedient 
for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this part of this Act. 
(2). Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) of this section and 
the provisions contained in this section, the Ministry may by regulation 
provide for- 
(a) the survey of ships and the issue of certificates. 
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(b) the types and forms of certificate 
(c) the construction and equipments of ships including the provision of life-
saving and fire- fighters appliances. 
(d) radio communications in ships. 
(e) the safety of navigation. 
(f) the carriage of grain by ships; 
(g) the carriage of dangerous goods by ships. 
(h) the safety of navigation. 
(i) the design, construction, surveys and marking of nuclear ships; 
(j) the management and safe operations of ships. 
(k) the construction, surveys and marking of high speed crafts; and 
(l) special measures to measures to enhance the memorandum on port state 
control. 
 
(3) The regulations made under this section shall, in the case of ships to which the 
safety Convention applies, include such requirements as appear to the Minister 
necessary for the implementation of the provisions of the Safety Convention or any 
International Convention on safety. 
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APPENDIX 2 
DISTRESS (PIRACY) FROM 2013 TO 2017 FROM NIMASA DATABASE 
S/N NATURE OF 
DISTRESS 
DATE/TIME REPORTED BY NAME/MMSI POSITION 
1 PIRACY ATTACK 09/01/2013 Letters  from Atlantic 
Shrimpers 
MFV LOTUS III 04 1.0N 
007 34.5E 
2 PIRACY ATTACK 
 
12/01/2013 
1832HRS LT 
CRS  MV ARMADA 107 03 51.8N 
006 45.81E 
3 PIRACY ATTACK 14/01/2013 
0941hrs LT 
SMS from GEN 
AROMIRE 
MFV UNIVERSAL V 04 15N  
007 47E 
4 PIRACY ATTACK 18/01/2013 
1759HRS 
Email from IMB MT ITRI Abidjan  
5 PIRACY ATTACK 31/01/2013 
0903HRS LT 
SMS from GEN 
AROMIRE 
MFV LOTUS 1 Near fish town 
6 PIRACY ATTACK 02/02/2013 
1559HRS LT 
EMAIL FROM IMB MT OLIVIA II 03 46.3N 
005 49.1E 
40Nm SW of the 
mouth or River Niger  
7 PIRACY ATTACK 03/02/2013 
1553HRS LT 
SMS FROM GEN 
AROMIRE 
MFV MERMAID II 
(MFV SILVER 
MERMAID II) 
AFTER FORCADOS 
8 PIRACY ATTACK 03/02/2013 
 
CALL FROM 
+971509122042 
MT PYXIS DELTA 06 19.14N 
003 24.2E 
9 PIRACY ATTACK 04/02/2013 
1249HRS LT 
EMAIL FROM IMB MT GASCOGNE 05 24.56N  
001 44.95E 
10 PIRACY ATTACK 05/02/2013 
1400 HRS LT 
LETTER FROM 
KARFLEX FISHRIES 
REENA Ajumo, Igbonla 
(Between Lagos & 
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LTD Ogun) 
11 PIRACY ATTACK 05/02/2013 
1400 HRS LT 
LETTER FROM 
KARFLEX FISHRIES 
LTD 
SABREENA East of Bush near 
Lekki, Lagos 
12 PIRACY ATTACK 06/02/2013 
1127HRS LT 
LOCAL MEDIA/IMB OIL BARGE 
BELONGING TO 
STERLING GLOBAL 
OIL RESOURCES 
NEAR 
FORCADOSWARRI, 
DELTA STATE 
13 PIRACY ATTACK 07/02/2013 
0021HRS LT 
EMAIL FROM IMB 
PRC 
MV ESTHER C 02 47N  
005 48E 
14 PIRACY ATTACK 08/02/2013 
1320HRS LT 
LETTER FROM 
ATLANTIC 
SHRIMPERS LTD 
MFV MALAMA 
ASIYA 
FISH TOWN 
15 PIRACY ATTACK 10/02/2013 
1714HRS LT 
EMAIL FROM IMB FT LAMU 1 04 17.7N 
007 53.3E 
16 PIRACY ATTACK 10/02/2013 
1714HRS LT 
EMAIL FROM IMB FT LAMU 2 04 17.7N 
007 53.3E 
17 PIRACY ATTACK 11/02/2013 
1500HRS 
SMS FROM AD SAR FT ORC V Bartholomew 
18 PIRACY ATTACK 11/02/2013 
1500HRS 
SMS FROM AD SAR FT ROBIN Bartholomew 
19 Attempted PIRACY 
ATTACK 
11/02/2013 
0123HRS 
EMAIL FROM IMB MV SAFMARINE 
SAHEL 
04 06.68N 
006 52.57E 
20 PIRACY ATTACK 12/02/2013 
1109HRS 
EMAIL FROM ED MS 
& SD 
WALVIS 7 03 33.55N 
006 35.39E 
21 PIRACY ATTACK 13/02/2013 
0438HRS 
EMAIL FROM IMB ARMADA TUGAS 1 03 40.48N 
005 53.12E 
22 PIRACY ATTACK 13/02/2013 EMAIL FROM IMB SEA BULK NIGER 04 0N 008 20E 
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2226HRS LT 91.82Nm SE of PORT 
HARCOURT 
23 Attempted PIRACY 
ATTACK 
17/02/2013 
0045HRS LT 
EMAIL FROM IMB DAMACO FRANCIA 03-33.2N  
006-20.45E. 
24 PIRACY ATTACK 17/02/2013083
9HRS LT 
EMAIL FROM IMB MV AFRICAN JOY 06 26.76N 003 22.70E 
APAPA PORT 
25 PIRACY ATTACK 17/02/2013150
1HRS LT 
EMAIL FROM IMB TUG ARMADA 
TUAH 101 
03. 57N 005 21.0E 
26 PIRACY ATTACK 18/02/2013 
1600HRS LT 
ATLANTIC 
SHRIMPERS LTD 
MFV LILY AND 
STAR SHRIMPER II 
OFF NICHOLAS 
BARBARA FISHING 
AREA AT 10 
FATHOMS 
27 PIRACY ATTACK 22/02/2013 
2011HRS 
CALL FROM THE 
VESSEL’S CAPTAIN 
MV KOTA 
BAHAGIA 
03 51N  
005 57E 
28 PIRACY ATTACK 01/03/2013 
1135HRS LT 
Call from ORC 7 
OWNER (Emire) 
ORC 7 Around Escravos 
29 PIRACY ATTACK 04/03/2013 
1240HRS LT 
SMS FROM 
ATLANTIC 
SHRIMPERS LTD 
MFV LEVI Between Fish Town & 
Middle Town 
30 PIRACY ATTACK 04/03/2013 
1402HRS LT 
SMS FROM 
ATLANTIC 
SHRIMPERS LTD 
MFV STAR 
SHRIMPER 3 
04 05N 
006 14.5E 
      
31 PIRACY ATTACK 04/03/2013 
1240HRS LT 
IMB VIA SMS ARAMADA 22 03 44N 
006 19.3E moved to 
03 49N  
006 50.8E 
32 PIRACY ATTACK 
(Sea Robbers) 
05/03/2013 
1304 HRS LT 
LETTER FROM 
KARFLEX FISHRIES 
REENA Along Badagry Waters 
Lagos 
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LTD 
33 PIRACY ATTACK 
(Sea Robbers) 
05/03/2013 
1400 HRS LT 
LETTER FROM 
KARFLEX FISHRIES 
LTD 
MAREENA Near Maroko Waters 
Lagos  
 
34 PIRACY ATTACK 
(Sea Robbers) 
05/03/2013 
1411 HRS LT 
LETTER FROM 
KARFLEX FISHRIES 
LTD 
SABREENA II Middleton, Dodo River 
and Brass 
35 Sea Robbery 09/03/2013 
2215Hrs LT 
Email from IMB LPG Tanker 06: 27N  
003: 23E 
36 PIRACY ATTACK 
(Sea Robbers) 
11/03/2013 
1242 HRS LT 
LETTER FROM 
KARFLEX FISHRIES 
LTD 
MAREENA III Benin River 
37 PIRACY ATTACK 
(Sea Robbers) 
11/03/2013 
1954 HRS LT 
SMS FROM GEN. 
AROMIRE 
STAR SHRIMPER 26 OFF BONNY 
TERMINAL 17NM 
OFF SHORE 
 
38 PIRACY ATTACK 
(Sea Robbers) 
21/03/2013 
2108 HRS LT 
SMS FROM GEN. 
AROMIRE 
MFV LILY III OFF FORMOSO 
ABOUT 12Nm 
 
39 PIRACY ATTACK 
(Sea Robbers) 
21/03/2013 
2108 HRS LT 
SMS FROM GEN. 
AROMIRE 
MFV LILY III OFF FORMOSO 
ABOUT 12Nm 
 
40 PIRACY ATTACK 
(Sea Robbers) 
21/03/2013 
2108 HRS LT 
SMS FROM GEN. 
AROMIRE 
MFV STAR 
SHRIMPER II 
& UNIVERSAL IV 
OFF 
SENGANA  ABOUT 
12Nm 
 
41 PIRACY ATTACK 
(Sea Robbers) 
26/03/2013 
1338 HRS LT 
SMS FROM GEN. 
AROMIRE 
MFV Cosmos 1 
& 2 
OFF SAMBRAREO 
ABOUT 12Nm 
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42 ATTEMPTED  PIR
ACY ATTACK 
31/03/2013 
0207hrs LT 
EMAIL FROM IMB MT SEA HERMES 03 57.3N  
006 41.0E 
43 PIRACY ATTACK 03/04/2013 
1500HRS LT 
Ministry Of Foreign 
Affairs 
ANDREA  Sao Tome  
and Principle and 
Gabon 
44 PIRACY ATTACK 09/04/2013 
1343HRS LT 
KARFLEX FISHERIES SABRENA II ANDONI 
45 PIRACY ATTACK 10/04/2013  
1104HRS LT 
BOURBON LIBERTY 
251 
IMO 636015324 
MV LEON DIAS 
    03 49N 
    06 24E 
46 PIRACY ATTACK 14/04/2013 
1225HRS LT 
Gen Araromi STAR SHRIMPER 2, 
STAR SHRIMPER 8, 
COSMOS 2 & 5 
Off Koulama River, 
close to Fish Town. 
47 PIRACY ATTACK 16/04/2006 
0154HRS LT 
IMB MV CAP 
THEODORA 
IMO: 9380740 
CALL  sign: SVAMS 
01 48N 
006 46E 
48 PIRACY ATTACK 19/04/2013 
1341HRS LT 
Letter from Atlantic 
Shrimpers Ltd 
MFV LILY II OFF Awoye deepwater 
49 PIRACY ATTACK 24/04/2013 
0933HRS LT 
SMS FROM VSL 
OWNERS 
MFV DAHLIA WITHIN BONNY 
AND QUO IBOE 
50 PIRACY ATACK 26/04/2013 
1635HRS LT 
PHONE CALL CITY OF XIAMEN 04 10.44N 
005 30.29E 
51 ATTEMPTED 
PIRACY ATACK 
26/04/2013 
1635HRS LT 
PHONE CALL FROM 
OWNERS 
CITY OF 
GUANGZHOU 
04 10.44N 
005 30.29E 
52 PIRACY ATTACK 05/05/2013 
1400HRS LT 
IMB CMA CGM AFRICA 
FOUR 
South of Port Harcourt 
53 ATTEMPTED 
PIRACY ATTACK 
05/05/2013 
1025HRS LT 
IMB MV FRIO ATHENS 33Nm SW of Bonny 
River 
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54 ATTEMPTED 
PIRACY ATTACK 
05/05/2013 
0425HRS LT 
US COAST GUARD, 
MRCC MALTA & 
ITALIAN MRCC 
SEA PRIDE 05 49N 
001 22E 
55 ATTEMPTED 
PIRACY ATTACK 
05/05/2013 
0516HRS LT 
Call from Captain of MT 
Tom Lene 
MT TOM LENE Capital Oil Jetty, 
Lagos Port 
56 PIRACY ATTACK 06/05/2013 
0940HRS LT 
EMAIL FROM IMB UTAI 8 30Nm of South of 
Bonny Coastline 
57 ATTEMPTED 
PIRACY ATTACK 
07/05/2013 
1737HRS LT 
EMAIL FROM IMB MV CENTENARIO 
BLU 
04 43.25N 
008 20.73E 
58 ATTEMPTED 
PIRACY ATTACK 
09/05/2013 
0131HRS LT 
VHF 16 MT BLUE GREEN 
TIGER 
06 19.8N 
003 26.7E 
59 PIRACY ATTACK 10/05/2013 
1457HRS LT 
SMS FROM GEN. 
AROMIRE 
MFV AWELE OFF BRASS 
60 PIRACY ATTACK 16/05/2013 
1200HRS LT 
SMS FROM 
ATLANTIC 
SHRIMPERS LTD 
MFV STAR 
SHRIMPERS V 
OFF PENNINGTON 
FISHING AREA 
61 UNCONFIRMED 
ABDUCTION 
18/05/2013 
0946HRS LT 
SMS FROM 
UNIDENTIFIED SOS  
ORC 7 & 
TRADEWIND 
BARTHOLOMEW 
AND  BONNY 
ANCHORAGE 
62 PIRACY ATTACK 20/05/2013 
1020HRS LT 
SMS FROM GEN 
AROMIRE 
ATLANTIC 
SHRIMPERS LTD 
STAR SHRIMPER 
XXIII, Silver Mermaid 
III and Rose III 
04 31.925N 
005 25.679E 
63 PIRACY ATTACK 20/05/2013 
1502HRS LT 
SMS FROM GEN 
AROMIRE ATLANTIC 
SHRIMPERS LTD 
STAR SHRIMPER VII OFF Nicholas  
64 PIRACY ATTACK 25/05/2013 
0830HRS LT 
CALL FROM JIBRIN 
KYARI FROM 
MATRIX SHIPPING  
MT MATRIX 1 03 34.17N 
005 27.07E 
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65 ATTEMPTED 
PIRACY ATTACK 
29/05/2013 
0830HRS LT 
VHF 16 Sea Adventurer 06 20.66N 
003 27.35E 
66 PIRACY ATTACK 01/06/2013 
1548HRS LT 
IMB BLUEGREEN TIGER A RIVER WITHIN 
CALABAR 
67 PIRACY ATTACK 05/06/2013 
1126HRS LT 
IMB  BOURBON 
ARETHUSE 
USARI FIELD, 
USAN PLATFORM 
68 PIRACY ATTACK 10/06/2013 
1530HRS LT 
GEN. AROMIRE MFV BISOLA Escravos Area 
69 PIRACY ATTACK 12/06/2013 
1100HRS LT 
Gen Aromire  
ATLANTIC 
SHRIMPERS LTD 
MFV COSMOS I, 
STAR SHRIMPER I & 
STAR SHRIMPER 
XIX 
OFF BRASS @ 10 
FATHOMS 
70 PIRACY ATTACK 12/06/2013 
1500HRS LT 
ATLANTIC 
SHRIPMERS 
MFV HAJIYA  
BINTA 
ESCRAVOS 
FORCADOS 
71 PIRACY ATTACK 14/06/2013 
1120HRS LT 
ED (MS&SD) MDPL 
CONTINENTAL 
04 02.5N 
008 00.3E 
54Nm SE OF Bonny 
JV Camp 
72 SUSPECTED 
PIRACY ATTACK 
14/06/2013 
0633HRS LT 
IMB MV BALAO 04 59N 
002 40.3E 
73 SUSPECTED 
PIRACY ATTACK 
18/06/2013 
0820HRS LT 
IMB SAINT PATRICK 04 25N 
007 28E 
7Nm SSW of Opobo 
River Estuary 
74 SUSPECTED 
PIRACY ATTACK 
18/06/2013 
1651HRS LT 
Karflex fisheries  
SMS 
MAREENA  II & III Under way to Lagos 
75 PIRACY ATTACK 01/07/2013 
1451HRS LT 
SMS FROM 
KINGSLEY 
ENAHORO 
STAR SHRIMPER 25, 
16 AND 18 
AROUND BRASS 
AREA “ABOUT 
0600HRS ON 
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27/06/2013 
76 PIRACY ATTACK 04/07/2013 
1508HRS LT 
ATLANTIC 
SHRIMPERS LTD 
MFV STAR 
SHRIMPER XXVIII 
OFF CALABAR 
COAST 
77 PIRACY ATTACK 10/07/2013 
0835HRS LT 
LETTER FROM 
ATLANTIC 
SHRIMPERS LTD 
MFV SHRIMPER 
XXX 
OFF DODO 
PENNINGTON 
78 PIRACY ATTACK 
(Suspicious) 
12/07/2013 
1701HRS LT 
EMAIL FROM IMB MT OVERSEAS 
ATHENS  
06 26.3N 
003 17.7E 
79 PIRACY ATTACK 
 
16/07/2013 
0834HRS LT 
EMAIL FROM IMB MT COTTON NEAR GABON 
01 39.07N 
003 50.02E 
80 PIRACY ATTACK 
 
18/07/2013 
1246HRS LT 
SMS FROM OWNERS MFV MADAM 
EMOTAN 
OPOBO/QUA IBOE 
AREA 
004 11 21.3N 
007 53 00.4E 
81 PIRACY ATTACK 22/07/2013 
1520HRS LT 
REPORT FROM 
CONOIL 
CONOIL TUG BOAT 
AND BARGE 
ENROUTE TO 
KOLUAMA FROM 
OLUGBOBIRI 
82 PIRACY ATTACK 25/07/2013 
1036HRS LT 
EMAIL FROM IMB MT LOULOU 04 16N 
007 56E 
83 ATTEMPTED 
PIRATE ATTACK 
28/07/2013 
0634HRS LT 
EMAIL FROM IMB MV PORT KENNY COTONOU 
ANCHORAGE 
84 ATTEMPTED 
PIRATE ATTACK 
31/07/2013 
0800HRS LT 
EMAIL FROM IMB HIGH JUPITER 03 31N 
006 05E 
85 PIRATE ATTACK 01/08/2013 
1027HRS LT 
08034505594 BUMI ARAMADA 
PERDANA 
05 23.16.66N 
86 PIRACY ATTACK 12/08/2013 
1050HRS LT 
LETTER FROM 
KARFLEX 
MEREENA 1 UNKNOWN 
87 PIRACY ATTACK 12/08/2013 SMS FROM GENERAL MFV STAR UNKNOWN 
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1404HRS LT AROMIRE SHRIMPER I 
88 ATTEMPTED 
PIRATE ATTACK 
12/08/2013 
1142HRS LT 
EMAIL FROM IMB MT FPMC 25 LAGOS ANCHORGE 
89 PIRACY ATTACK 14/08/2013 
0900HRS LT 
LETTER FROM 
ATLANTIC 
SHRIMPERS LTD 
MFV SILVER 
MERMAID II 
& LEVI 
FORCADOS AT 
16Nm & 15Fathoms 
respectively 
90 PIRACY ATTACK 14/08/2013 
1310HRS LT 
AD COMM/NNPC MT NOTRE LAGOS 
ANCHORAGE 
91 PIRACY ATTACK 14/08/2013 
 
REP.’S PHONE 
CALL/IMB 
SP ATLANTA LAGOS AREA 
92 PIRACY ATTACK 14/08/2013 
2057HRS LT 
OWNERS PHONE 
CALL 
PRAMARA 
SHIPPING BARGE 
06 09.25N 
004 34.31E 
93 ATTEMPTED 
PIRATE ATTACK 
14/08/2013 
0340HRS LT 
OWNERS PHONE 
CALL 
BLUE GREEN TIGRE LAGOS 
ANCHORAGE 
94 PIRATE ATTACK 15/08/2013 
1046HRS LT 
INFO FROM OIC MGC MT CROW 06 14.24N 
004 20.52E 
95 PIRACY ATTACK 15/08/2013 
1850HRS 
EMAIL FROM IMB MV LETAVIA 05 05N 
003 42E 
96 PIRACY ATTACK 19/08/2013 
1100HRS LT 
SMS FROM OWNER MFV ADUNOLA 
AND OTHERS 
BRASS/FISHING 
TOWN/NICHOLAS 
97 ATTEMPTED 
PIRATE ATTACK 
22/08/2013 
0900HRS LT 
LETTER FROM VSL 
MANAGERS 
MT BLUE SKY 04 00.21N 
009 12.87E 
98 SUSPECTED 
PIRATE ATTACK 
26/08/2013 
1321HRS LT 
SMS FROM AD SAR 
(FROM THE VSL 
AGENT) 
MT  VARY STARR 07 54.16N 
001 30.77S 
99 ATTEMPTED 
PIRATE ATTACK 
27/08/2013 
0700HRS 
FROM MEDIA 
(NATIONAL TV 
NEWS) 
BRENDA CORLETT ORON PILATE 
ISLAND, CALABAR 
100 PIRACY ATTACK 10/09/13  0949 Babatunde James        MT SAMPATIKI DANTATA Jetty, 
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hrs TINCAN 
101 PIRACY ATTACK 26/08/13  
1000Hrs 
CRS SPEED BOAT 04 33N 007 08E 
102 PIRACY ATTACK 11/08/13 
 
CRS PASSENGER BOATS 04 26N 
006 46E 
103 PIRACY ATTACK 11/09/13  0019
hrs 
Atlantic shrimper  MFV Cosmos 1,SS1X 
SSVI And XV 
Qua Iboe shore range 
104 PIRACY ATTACK 
(Loss of 
Communication) 
03/10/2013 
0822HRS LT 
OWNERS  
PHONE CALL & 
EMAIL 
 
MT MALPENSA 04 12.31”N 
006 56.62”E 
105 PIRACY ATTACK 08/10/2013 
1624HRS LT 
EMAIL FROM VSL 
AGENT 
MT BELISARE MRS DANTATA 
JETTY 
106 PIRACY ATTACK 15/10/2013 
1402HRS LT 
SMS FROM OWNER 
(ATLANTIC 
SHRIMPERS) 
MFV ADUNOLA NEAR BRASS 
107 PIRACY ATTACK 24/10/2013 
0600HRS LT 
EMAIL FROM IMB C-RETRIEVER OFF BRASS, 
BAYELSA STATE 
108 PIRACY ATTACK 24/10/2013 
2208HRS LT 
VHF CALL FROM 
PORT CONTROL 
HISTIA CORAL LAGOS WATERS 
06 17.301N  
003 22.151E 
109 PIRATE ATTACK 03/11/2013 
1728HRS 
IMB EMAIL MV Waterloo  
 
 
110 PIRACY ATTACK 12/11/2013 
1500HRS LT 
EMAIL FROM NEMA MV Surfer 322 04 01.8N  
009 39.6E 
111 PIRACY ATTACK 12/11/2013 
1500HRS LT 
EMAIL FROM USCG JASCON 12 5.30N  
4.59E 
112 PIRACY ATTACK 16/12/2013 
0102HRS LT 
MRCC FRANCE MV ATLANTA 03 55.9N 
007 49.8E 
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113 PIRACY ATTACK 13/01/2014 
 
IMB MT ALTHEA 
 
114 PIRACY ATTACK 21/01/2014 
1215HRS  
EMAIL FROM IMB MT KERALA 08 41S 
013 15E 
115 PIRACY  
DISTRESS  
05/02/2014 
0815HRS 
MRCC 
ROME/IMB/MRCC 
AUSTRALIA/MADRID 
SUEZ VASILIS 
538004317  
03 45.0N 
006 24.E 
116 ATTEMPT. 
PIRACY 
 
18/02/2014 
0502HRS 
 
IMB 
MAIL 
MT MASTERS 
FORCE II 
03 57N 
005 13E 
117 PIRACY 
ATTACK/ 
KIDNAP 
04/03/2014 
0404HRS 
IMB MV PRESCIOS1 OMC  
STATION 
118 PIRACY 
ATTACK 
05/03/2014 
0623HRS 
IMB MV SSI  
PRIDE 
04 00.2N 
005 16.6E 
118 PIRACY 
ATTACK/ 
KIDNAP 
06/03/2014 
2219HRS 
CAPT. 
NALIN 
PRIME 
LADY  
04 11.3N 
005 44.8E 
120 PIRACY 
ATTACK/ 
KIDNAP 
08/03/2014 
1334HRS 
C.S. OFFSHORE 
 
MDPL 
ASHA 
DEEP 
ONNE 
 
121 ATTEMPTED  
PIRACY 
ATTACK 
23/04/2014 
2312HRS 
IMB MT HELLESPOINT 
PROGRESS 
538090209 
06 17.8N 
003 21.57E 
122 PIRACY 
ATTACK 
30/04/2014 
0034HRS 
IMB SP BRUSSELS 04 56.71N 
004 49.51E 
123 ROBBERY 13/05/2014 
1044HRS 
CAPT. 
ASLAM 
UNGIESHI 
9261841 
04 45.82N 
006 59.15E 
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124 PIRACY ATTACK 02/06/2014 IMB PIRACY 
REPORTING CENTRE 
MV LU HAI 
IMO: 9159452 
 
04-49.3N 008-18.2E 
(PARROT ISLAN) 
CALABAR RIVER. 
125 ATTEMPTED 
PIRACY 
10/06/2014 
1134HRS 
MR. DOLPHIN 
NOVO 
OML 120 DELTA 
FPSO AMADA 
PADANA 
126 PIRATE HIJACK 30/07/2014 
0519HRS 
IMB MT HAI SOON 6 POSITION  
CHAGING 
127 ATTEMPTED 
PIRACY 
08/08/14 
0349HRS 
MERCHANT NAVY 
LIAISON OFFICER 
B.W LENA 04  45.0N 
002 55.0E 
128 ATTEMPTED 
PIRACY 
26/08/14 
1930HRS 
MRCC FRANCE MT SEA STERLING 04 14.45N 
005 13.31E 
129  
PIRACY ATTACK 
27/08/14 IMB SP BOSTON OFFSHOR ABIDJAN 
130 ATTEMPTED  
PIRATE 
ATTACK 
10/01/2015 
0725HRS 
IMB 
MALAYSIA 
 
MT EQUINOX NOT  
GIVEN 
131 HIJACK  10/02/2015 
1240HRS 
OIC 
RMAC 
FV LURONG 
YUANYU 917 
04 26N 
001 43W 
132 PIRACY 
ATTACK 
 
04/02/2015 
0800HRS 
CRS MT KALAMOS 
229776000 
04 12.277N 
008 04.281E 
133 ATTEMPTED 
ATTACK  
05/02/2015 
1700HRS 
IMB MT  
REMI 
05 28.5N 
005 05.54E 
134 PIRATE  
ATTACK 
19/03/15 IMB  
MALAYIA 
MARIDIVE 
603 
04 14N 
007 59E 
135 HIJACKED 08/04/2015 DMSSS SUFFER 1440 04 18.5N 
008 19.7E 
136 ATTEMPTED  09/04/2015 IMB MT  AT  
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PIRATE HIGH ANCHORAGE 
137 PIRATE  
ATTACKED 
18/05/2015 
0306HRS 
JRCC 
NORWAY 
KOTA 
SAHABAT 
3 51N 
007 08E 
138 SEA PIRATE 10/06/15 
1105HRS 
CHAIRMAN 
MARITIME 
AKASSA 
SPEED BOAT OKOBOTUO 
139 SEA 
PIRATE  
ATTACKED 
13/06/15 
0821HRS 
SHETTIMAH 
& 
WATCHMAN 
UNKNOWN JETTY 
OGBOKIRI 
AKASSA 
140 PIRACY 21/10/15 
1820HRS 
INMARSAT C 
ALERT 
TSL  
INTREPID 
04 31.63N 
004 38.71E 
141 SEA PIRATE  
ATTACKED 
08/11/2015 
1330HRS 
Fyi and Furthet 
Aromire 
MFV LILY III Bonny Area  
142 PIRATE  
ATTACKED 
9/11/15 Letter  
JEVKON OIL GAS 
MT  
BREAKTHRUNG 
 
143 PIRATE 
ATTACKED 
19/01/2016 
1150HRS 
CONNECT SHIPPING 
OPERATION  
MANAGER 
SILVER SKY 03 56N 
005 12E 
144 Suspicious  
PIRATE 
ATTACK 
23/01/2016 
1216HRS 
CAPT. DESIKAN 
08107977689 
MT BREEZE 03 52N 
005 47E 
145 PIRATE 
ATTACK 
 
29/01/2016 
1311HRS 
IMB MV AJEMISAN 04 05 N 
005 25.50E 
146 HIJACK 
 
30/01/2016 
2125HRS 
CRS MT LEON DIAX 04 26.5N 
005 32.2E 
147 PIRATE 
ATTACK 
 
11/02/2016 
1724HRS 
EMAIL 
 
NAVE JUPITER 03 36N 
005 37E 
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148 PIRATE 
ATTACK 
 
12/02/2016 
0432HRS 
RMRCC 
KOREA 
MT MAXIMUM 
357132000 
3 55.5N 
3 47.6W 
149 PIRATE 
ATTACK 
16/02/2016 
1208HRS 
MRCC 
LOME 
MT DEJIKUM 02 22.05N 
002 31.90E 
150 PIRATE 
ATTACK 
21/02/2016 
1812 HRS 
 
MT MISS LUCY 04 23N 
000 05E 
152 PIRATE 
ATTACK 
11/03/2016 
 
INMARSAT C 
 
JASCON 39 
437641510 
04 41.32N 
007 09.46E 
 
152 ATTEMPTED 
PIRATE 
ATTACK 
11/03/2016 
2304HRS 
 
IMB  MV GLYFADA 
41346001 
05 36N 
005 13E 
 
153 PIRATE 
ATTACK 
06/02/17 MDAT-GOG BBC CARRIBBEAN 03.709N 007.939 E,  
GULF OF GUINEA 
154 PIRATE 
ATTACK 
08/02/2017 IMB MT GAZ 
PROVIDENCE 
03 22 0N 
007 13 5E 
155 PIRATE 
ATTACK 
08/03/2017 
1653HRS 
CAPT. BRUCE MT EBUNOLA 03 49.3N  005 21.44E 
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APPENDIX 3 
ATTACKS ON VESSELS IN NIGERIAN WATERS FROM JANUARY – DECEMBER 2014 
JANUARY 2014 
DATE NAME OF 
VESSEL 
TYPE OF VESSEL FLAGS OF 
VESSEL 
LOCATION No OF CREW 
ONBOARD 
REMARK 
(a)  (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) 
21 JAN14 
 
MT KERALA 
 
TANKER LIBERIA LAT O N03O 37 
01N LONG 005O 
08 23E 
27 Indian, 
Philippine and 
Romania 
 
 
 
FEBRUARY 2014 
SER DATE NAME OF 
VESSEL 
TYPE OF 
VESSEL 
FLAGS 
OF 
VESSEL 
LOCATION No OF CREW 
ONBOARD 
 REMARK 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
1. 06 FEB 
14 
CHER TANKER PANAMA OFF BRASS 
RIVER 
ENTRANCE 
25 Philippines  
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2. 06 FEB 
14 
OFFSHORE 
TUG 
MARINER 
SEA 
CARGO NIGERIA LAT 03O 49”N 
LONG 
005O13”E 
  
3. 19 FEB 
14 
MT 
MASTER 
FORCE 11 
TANKER LIBERIA LAT 03O 57”N 
LONG 
005:13”E 
2 Indians 
19 Nigerians 
 
 
MARCH 2014 
SER DATE NAME OF 
VESSEL 
TYPE OF VESSEL FLAGS OF 
VESSEL 
LOCATION No OF CREW 
ONBOARD 
REMARK 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
1. 04 MAR 14 PRINCE 
JOSEPH 1 
TUG NIGERIA LAT 
04O17”N 
LONG 007O 
53”E 
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2. 04 MAR 
14 
SSI PRIDE CARGO MARSHAL 
ISLAND 
LAT 
04O00΄2”N 
LONG 
005O16.6”E 
  
3. 06 MAR 
14 
PRIME 
LADY 
OTHER NIGERIA LAT 
04O11΄60”N 
LONG005O44΄
04”E 
 
14 Nigerian 
1 Ukraine 
 
 
4. 20 MAR 
14 
MT CRETE TANKER LIBERIA LAT 
4O14΄00”N 
LONG005O
00”E 
4 Greeks 
2 Ukraine 
4 Georgina 
5 Nigerian 
8 Ghana 
 
 
APRIL 2014 
SER DATE NAME OF 
VESSEL 
TYPE OF 
VESSEL 
FLAGS OF 
VESSEL 
LOCATION No OF CREW 
ONBOARD 
REMARK 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
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1. 23 APR 14 MT 
HELLESPONT 
PROGRESS 
TANKER MARSHALL LAT 
06O17.8”N 
LONG 003O 
21.5”E 
 
24 
 
2. 21 APR 14 MT METHANE 
MICKIE HARPER 
TANKER BERMUDA LAT 
03O41”N 
LONG 
003O21”E 
  
3. 29 APR 14 SP BRUSSELS TANKER BELGIUM LAT 04O 
56.7”N 
LONG 
4O49.5”E 
15  
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MAY 2014 
DATE NAME OF 
VESSEL 
TYPE OF 
VESSEL 
FLAGS OF 
VESSEL 
LOCATION No OF CREW 
ONBOARD 
REMARK 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) 
16 MAY 14 MT UNGIESHI TANKER PANAMA LAT 
04O45.80”N 
LONG 
006O59.15”E 
16 Indians 
1 Bangladeshi 
 
 
JUNE 2014 
SE
R 
DATE NAME OF 
VESSEL 
TYPE OF 
VESSEL 
FLAGS OF 
VESSEL 
LOCATION No OF CREW 
ONBOARD 
REMARK 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
1. 04 JUN 14 WORLD 
MARINE 
711 
FISHING 
VESSEL 
 LAT 05O14”N 
LONG 02O16”N 
  
2. 03 JUN 14 MT 
SAMPATI
KI 
TANKER LIBERIA LAT 05O 56”N 
LONG 02O16”E 
16 Indians 
2 Ukraine 
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3. 04 JUN 14 MT 
FAIR 
ARTE
MIS 
TANKER LIBERIA LAT04O47΄50.40”N 
LONG 01O12.40”W 
17 Pilipino 
1 Ghana 
4 Seri lanker 
1 Myanmar 
1 Charterer’s 
representative Myanmar 
2 Greek 
Nationalities 
onboard 
 
 
JULY 2014 - NTR. 
 
AUGUST 2014    
DATE NAME OF 
VESSEL 
TYPE OF 
VESSEL 
FLAGS OF VESSEL LOCATION No OF CREW 
ONBOARD 
REMAR
K 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) 
28 AUG 
14 
SEA STERLING TANKER NIGERIA LAT 04΄12”N 
LONG 05΄15”E 
1 Pakistani 
9 Indians 
6 Nigerians 
1 Ukraine 
Vesse
l is 
Safe 
 
SEPTEMBER 2014  - NTR. 
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OCTOBER 2014 
 
SER DATE NAME OF VESSEL TYPE OF 
VESSEL 
FLAGS OF 
VESSEL 
LOCATION No OF CREW 
ONBOARD 
REMARK 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
1. 17 OCT 
14 
SAINT 
PATRICK 
ACCOM 
MODATI 
ON 
ST VINCENT 
GRENADI NES 
04:16N 
008:00E 
  
2. 25 OCT 
14 
MT STRIDER 
(IMO:0514494) 
  06:19.19N 
003:24.77E 
  
3. 25 OCT 
14 
MV GRACELAND 
(IMO:9571208) 
  04:23N 
006:16E 
  
 
NOVEMBER 2014 
 
SER DATE NAME OF 
VESSEL 
TYPE OF 
VESSEL 
FLAGS OF 
VESSEL 
LOCATION No OF CREW   
ONBOARD 
REMARK 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
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1. 4 NOV 14 IRENES LOGOS 
(IMO: 9123922) 
CONTAINER PANAMA 40NM South of 
Nigerian coast 
04:03:31N 
005:28E 
18 Philippines 
1 Romalnian4 
Ukrainians 
 
2. 5 NOV 14 BASAT 
(IMO: 9447029) 
TANKER MALTA  14 Turkish Pirates 
boarded the 
ship and 2 
crew 
members 
were taken 
hostage. 
3. 5 NOV 14 MT SEA 
VOYAGER 
(IMO: 9044073) 
TANKER TOGO (TG) 04:00:58N 
005:19:21E 
 NN personnel 
onboard repelled 
the attack and 6 
sea robbers were 
killed. Two 
AK47 
magazines with 
60 rounds of 
ammo were 
recovered. 
Vessel is Safe. 
4. 8 NOV 14 LADY 
ELIZABETH 
(IMO: 9446491) 
TANKER LIBERIA 04:05:87N 
005:03:61E 
 Vessel 
is Safe 
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5. 8 NOV 14 IDOMA RIVER 
102 (TUG) 
TUG  03:54N 005:29E   
6. 8 NOV 14 IDOMA RIVER 
103 (TUG) 
TUG  03:54N 005:29E   
7. 21 NOV14 SEA GRACE 
(IMO: 8806682) 
TANKER  Off Lagos  
Nigeria 
  
 
DECEMBER 2014 
 
SER DATE NAME OF 
VESSEL 
TYPE OF 
VESSEL 
FLAGS OF 
VESSEL 
LOCATION No OF CREW 
ONBOARD 
REMARK 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
1. 19 DEC 
14 
TORM LOUISE 
(IMO:9392482) 
 
TANKER DENMARK 06:26.145N 
003:19.625E 
8 Danish 
1 Croatian 
1 Indian 
12 Filipino 
2 Robbers boarded the 
vessel and immediately 
the Captain notified 
Nigerian Navy and 
NIMASA. NN personnel 
responded and made a 
search of the area with a 
patrol boat. Vessel is 
Safe. 
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APPENDIX 4 
ATTACKS ON VESSELS IN NIGERIAN WATERS FROM JANUARY – DECEMBER 2015 
JANUARY 2015 
 
v DATE NAME OF 
VESSEL 
TYPE OF 
VESSEL 
FLAGS OF 
VESSEL 
LOCATION No OF CREW 
ONBOARD 
REMARK 
(a) (
b
) 
(c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
1. 10 JAN 
15 
MT MARIAM TANKER COOK 
ISLANDS 
OFF SHORE 
ESCRAVOS 
 Ghana Navy rescued 
the vessel 25nm south 
of Tema Port 
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FEBRUARY 2015 
 
SER DATE NAME OF 
VESSEL 
TYPE OF 
VESSEL 
FLAGS OF 
VESSEL 
LOCATION No OF CREW 
ONBOARD 
REMARK 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
1. 01 FEB 
15 
MT REMI 
(IMO: 8805470) 
TANKER NIGERIA 05:28:50N 
005:05:54E 
6 Pakistani 
11 Nigerians 
4 Egyptians 
2 Bangladeshi 
2 Ghanaians 
The Master called 
Local Authorities 
and alerts all vessels 
within the vicinity 
and forwarded 
message to Nigerian 
Navy and Escravos 
Port Authority. 
2. 03 FEB 
15 
MT KALAMOS 
(IMO: 9197832) 
TANKER MALTA 04:12:28.699N 
008:04:26.519E 
23 Crew members Pirates killed a Greek 
deputy captain of the 
ship, and took two 
Greeks and a Pakistani 
citizen hostage, 
according to the Greek 
government. The 
remaining 19 crew 
members are believed 
to be safe. 
3. 05 FEB 
15 
MT SIRA 
(IMO: 9408803) 
TANKER MARSHALL 
ISLANDS 
06:26.6N 
003:22.8E 
22 Crew members Attempted Attack. 
Vessel is Safe. 
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MARCH 2015 
 
SER DATE NAME OF 
VESSEL 
TYPE OF 
VESSEL 
FLAGS OF 
VESSEL 
LOCATION No OF CREW 
ONBOARD 
REMARK 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
1. 3 MAR 
15 
MV GREEN 
KLIPPER 
(IMO: 9001904) 
CARGO 
(REEFER) 
BAHAMAS LAGOS 14 Attempted attack. The 
Master sounded 
general alarm, Anti- 
piracy, increased 
watch level, all spaces 
on deck closed and 
sealed. Vessel is safe. 
2. 12 MAR 
15 
MT SEA FORCE TANKER MARSHALL 
ISLAND 
APAPA 5 
TERMINAL 
LAGOS 
21 FILIPINOS Thieves boarded the 
M/T 'Sea Force' and 
stole about 5 cubic 
meters of cargo (lube 
oil). The thieves 
jumped overboard 
when they were 
sighted. All crew are 
safe / no injury. 
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3. 19 MAR 
15 
MV MARIDIVE 
(IMO: 9647007) 
Offshore Supply 
Vessel 
BELIZE 04:14N - 007:59E, 
around 18NM 
South of Kwa Iboe, 
Nigeria. 
11 Egyptian 
11 Nigerian 
2 Client Rep 
Two crew members 
were kidnapped and 
12 VHF’s and 2 
Laptops were 
reported stolen. 
Investigation 
ongoing. 
4. 21 MAR 
15 
YOHO 
 
(IMO: 7370181) 
FSO MARSHALL 
ISLANDS 
04:02.8N – 
007:31.41E YOHO 
TERMINAL 
59 (Nigerians, 
Ghanaians, 
Americans, 
Indians, 
Philippines 
and British) 
Successful 
attack. 
Investigation 
ongoing. 
 
APRIL 2015 
 
SER DATE NAME OF 
VESSEL 
TYPE OF 
VESSEL 
FLAGS OF 
VESSEL 
LOCATION No OF CREW 
ONBOARD 
REMARK 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
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1. 09 
APRIL 
15 
MT HIGH MARS 
(IMO:9366275) 
TANKER HONGKONG 06 17.4 N 
003 23.3 E 
Lagos anchorage 
14 – Indian 
6 - Filipinos 
1 – Bangladeshi 
1 – Russian 
A source disclosed 
that the two sea 
robbers were later 
captured by 
Nigerian Navy 
patrol boat. Vessel 
is safe as no 
casualty was 
recorded 
 
MAY 2015 
 
SER DATE NAME OF 
VESSEL 
TYPE OF 
VESSEL 
FLAGS OF 
VESSEL 
LOCATION No OF CREW 
ONBOARD 
REMARK 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
1. 14 
MAY 
15 
ITHUAKU1 TANKER - 040 01’00 N 
0070 05’ 00 E 
6 NIL 
2. 14 
MAY 
15 
MT RIO TANKER - 040 01’00 N 
0070 05’ 00 E 
3 NIL 
3. 26 
MAY 
15 
MT KARINA 
THERESA 
TANKER DENMARK - 15  
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JUN  2015 
 
SE
R 
DATE NAME OF 
VESSEL 
TYPE OF 
VESSEL 
FLAGS OF 
VESSEL 
LOCATION No OF CREW 
ONBOARD 
REMARK 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
1. 8 JUN 
15 
MV BUTLER 
SPIRIT 
CARGO NIGERIAN 040 13’52 N 
0070 57’48 E 
18 NIL 
 
JUL 2015 
 
SE
R 
DATE NAME OF 
VESSEL 
TYPE OF 
VESSEL 
FLAGS OF 
VESSEL 
LOCATION No OF CREW 
ONBOARD 
REMARK 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
1. - - - - - - - 
 
AUG 2015 
 
SE
R 
DATE NAME OF 
VESSEL 
TYPE OF 
VESSEL 
FLAGS OF 
VESSEL 
LOCATION No OF CREW ONBOARD REMARK 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
1. Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 
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SEPTEMBER 2015 
 
SER DATE NAME OF 
VESSEL 
TYPE OF 
VESSEL 
FLAGS OF 
VESSEL 
LOCATION No OF CREW ONBOARD REMARK 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
1. Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 
 
OCTOBER 2015 
 
SER DATE NAME OF 
VESSEL 
TYPE OF 
VESSEL 
FLAGS OF 
VESSEL 
LOCATION No OF CREW ONBOARD REMARK 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
1. 19 OCT 
15 
MV SOLARTE TANKER  100 NM OFF 
BONNY FWB 
4  
2. 19 OCT 
15 
MT   
BRIGHTEST 
STAR 
TANKER  OFF BONNY FWB 2  
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NOVEMBER 2015 
 
SER DATE NAME OF 
VESSEL 
TYPE OF 
VESSEL 
FLAGS OF 
VESSEL 
LOCATION No OF CREW ONBOARD REMARK 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
1. 26 
NOV15 
MV SZAFIR CARGO CYPRUS 040 00’33N 
0050 24’15E 
16 Polish Onboard Two boats 
equipped with fire 
arms boarded the 
vessel. 
 
DECEMBER 2015 
 
SER DATE NAME OF 
VESSEL 
TYPE OF 
VESSEL 
FLAGS OF 
VESSEL 
LOCATION No OF CREW ONBOARD REMARK 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
1. 11 DEC 
15 
MT ANANTA TANKER  AGGIE BURUTU  5 Expatriates who 
are mainly Indians 
were kidnapped 
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APPENDIX 5 
ATTACKS ON VESSELS IN NIGERIAN WATERS FROM JANUARY – DECEMBER 2016 
 
SER DATE NAME OF 
VESSEL 
TYPE OF 
VESSEL 
FLAG OF 
VESSEL 
LOCATION NO OF CREW 
ONBOARD 
SOURCE REMARK 
(a) (b) ( c)  (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (j) 
1. 13 jan 16 MV KULAK IX Fishing 
Trawler 
 DODO River 
Bayelsa, 
Nigeria 
 Internation
al 
Maritime 
Bureau 
( IMB ) 
Armed Sea 
Pirate Boarded 
the Vessel 
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2. 15 Jan 
16 
MV AJEMISAN 
IMO 9688051 
MMSI 657126500 
 Nigeria Lat 000  
05’00”N 
Long 0050  
25’ 50”E, 
NM SW of 
Bayelsa, 
Nigeria 
15  Nigerians Internation
al 
Maritime 
Bureau 
( IMB ) 
Five Armed 
Pirate Boarded 
the Vessel and a 
Patrol Boat was 
deployed. 
3. 14 Jan 
16 
MV AKEMI – JOE Cargo Nigeria Lat 050  36’N 
Long 0050 
00’E Escravos 
area of Delta 
State 
 Internation
al 
Maritime 
Bureau 
( IMB ) 
Pirate Abducted 
16 Passengers 
and Two Crew 
Members 
investigation in 
progress. 
4. 14 Jan 
16 
CV 218 Passenger 
Boat 
 Ogbia / 
Nembe, 
Around 22 NM 
ENE of Brass 
 Internation
al 
Maritime 
Bureau 
( IMB ) 
No Casualties 
were Reported 
as the Assailants 
were said to 
have Retreated 
after a heavy 
Gunfight with 
Security 
Operatives. 
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5. 18 Jan 
16 
MV WAO BENUE 
MMSI 657011046 
Security 
Boat 
 CONOIL 
Production Rig 
IN Aunty 
JULIE Field, 
Bayelsa State 
 Internation
al 
Maritime 
Bureau 
( IMB ) 
The Passengers 
were 
Subsequently 
Robbed and 
Abandoned by 
the creek side. 
One person was 
reportedly killed 
and at least three 
others sustained 
injuries. 
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6. 17 Jan 
16 
PASSENGER 
BOAT 
Passenger 
Boat 
 Lat 040  50’N 
Long 0050  
40’E 
 International 
Maritime 
Bureau 
( IMB ) 
 
7. 19 Jan 
16 
RO-RO SILVER 
SKY IMO 8519722, 
MMSI 37320600, 
CALL SING 3EZX8 
Cargo Panama Lat 030 58’N
 Long 
040 02’E 
around 64NM 
SW of 
Bayelsa 
- International 
Maritime 
Bureau 
( IMB ) 
Armed Sea Pirate 
Boarded the 
Vessel 
8. 19 Jan 
16 
MV KOTA SEGAR 
IMO 9681235 
MMSI 565357000 
Cargo  Lat 030  
05’06”N 
Long 0060  
07’E 
 International 
Maritime 
Bureau 
( IMB ) 
Investigation in 
progress. 
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9. 19 Jan 
16 
TUG BOAT   Pennington 
Oil Terminal, 
Bayelsa State 
 International 
Maritime 
Bureau 
( IMB ) 
Investigation in 
progress 
10. 19 Jan 
16 
CREW BOAT Passenger 
Boat 
- Brass Water 
Ways Bayelsa 
State 
16 
Personnel 
and 2 
Crew 
Members 
were 
adopted 
International 
Maritime 
Bureau 
( IMB ) 
Investigation in 
progress 
11. 20 Jan 
16 
PASSENGER 
BOAT 
Passenger 
Boat 
- Nembe Water 
Ways Bayelsa 
State 
12 People 
were 
Adopted 
International 
Maritime 
Bureau 
( IMB ) 
Investigation in 
progress 
12. 22  Jan 
16 
PASSENGER 
BOAT 
Passenger 
Boat 
- Kula Water 
Ways Rivers 
State 
1 Person 
was 
Adopted 
International 
Maritime 
Bureau 
( IMB ) 
Investigation in 
progress 
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13. 23 Jan 
16 
SEA 
ADVENTURER 
Tanker Nigeria Pennington 
Oil Terminal, 
Bayelsa State 
 International 
Maritime 
Bureau 
( IMB ) 
Investigation in 
progress 
14. 31 Jan 
16 
MT LEON DIAS 
IMO 9279927 
CALL SIGN A8ZZ7 
Tanker Liberia Lat 030 
38.4N Long 
0050 29.1E 
Around 
45NM SW 
of Bayelsa, 
Nigeria. 
 International 
Maritime 
Bureau 
( IMB ) 
Armed Pirate 
Boarded the 
Vessel took some 
of the Crew 
Members 
Hostage. 
Investigation on 
the attack is still 
Ongoing. 
15. 4 Feb 16 PSKOV 
IMO 963OO28 
Tanker  Bonny LNG 
Terminal 
 International 
Maritime 
Bureau 
( IMB ) 
Ship’s Crew 
Foiled the attack 
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16. 5  Feb 16 MV SAFMARINE 
KURAMO IMO 
9289207 MMSI 
566416000 CALL 
SIGN 
9V9864 
Cargo 
 
Singapore Lat 040  02’ 
02”N 
Long 060  
59’39”E 
 International 
Maritime 
Bureau 
( IMB ) 
Sea Robbers 
Boarded the 
Vessel but was 
foiled by the NN 
who deployed 3 
of its Vessels. 
17. 11 Feb 
16 
NAVE JUPITER 
IMO 9567038 
MMSI 538005584 
CALL SIGN V7FE4 
Tanker Marshall 
Island 
Lat 030  33’ 
17”N 
Long 050  
35’24”E 
 International 
Maritime 
Bureau 
( IMB ) 
Sea Robbers 
Boarded the 
Vessel 
Investigation on 
the Attack is still 
Ongoing. 
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18. 11 Feb16 MT MAXIMUS 
IMO 9346174 
MMSI 375312098 
Tanker Panama Lat 010  36’ 
34”N 
Long 030  
37’24”E 
18 Crew 
Members, 
2 were 
taken 
Hostage. 1 
Indian and 
1 Pakistan 
and later 
released. 
International 
Maritime 
Bureau 
( IMB ) 
NNS 
CENTENARY 
and SAGBAMA 
was deployed to 
rescue the Vessel 
19. 23 Feb 
15 
BOURBON 
LIBERTY IMO 
9573593 
MMSI 258534000 
CALL SING LXXZ 
Cargo Luxebourg Lat 030  54’ 
04”N 
Long 050  
18’22”E 
2 Crew 
members 
were taken 
Hostage. 
International 
Maritime 
Bureau 
( IMB ) 
Sea Pirate 
Hijacked the 
Vessel 
Investigation on 
the Attack is still 
Ongoing. 
 
20. 5 Mar 16 MT MADONNA 1 
IMO 9407031 
MMSI 370698000 
Cargo Panama Lat 040  05’ 
45”N 
Long 060  
41’16”E 
5 Crew 
Members 
were taken 
Hostage 
International 
Maritime Bureau 
( IMB ) 
Sea Pirate 
Attacked 
the 
Vessel 
Investigat
ion is 
Ongoing 
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21. 7 Mar  16 JASCON 67 
IMO 9690779 
MMSI 657124800 
CALL SING 5NZX6 
Tug Nigeria Lat 030  51’8N 
Long 0040  
39’9E 
20 Crew 
Members. 
16 
Nigerians, 
2 
Ukraine, 1, 
Honduran 
and 1 
Indonesian. 
2 Crew 
Members 
were taken 
Hostage. 
International 
Maritime Bureau 
( IMB ) 
Sea Pirate 
Attacked 
the 
Vessel 
Investigat
ion is 
Ongoing 
22. 11 Mar 
16 
MT BRIGHT  WAY 
IMO 9588146 
MMSI 566422000 
CALL SIGN 9V8755 
Tanker Singapore Lat 020  
46’03”N 
Long 0040  
54’30”E 
 International 
Maritime Bureau 
( IMB ) 
Sea Pirate 
Attacked 
the 
Vessel 
Investigat
ion is 
Ongoing 23. 11 Mar 
16 
MV GLYFADA IMO 
9104586 
Cargo Malta   International 
Maritime Bureau 
( IMB ) 
 
Investigat
ion is 
ongoing 
 
 
100 
24. 15 Mar16 LEKONI IMO 
9684770 
MMSI 375539000 
Tanker St Vincent 100nm off 
Brass 
2 Crew 
Members 
Were taken 
Hostage Mr 
YAHG 
Jushan and 
Mr Jiao 
Shengli 
International 
Maritime Bureau 
( IMB ) 
9 
Attackers
, 1 Speed 
Boat 
(Blue 
Colour, 
Name: 
PHOSE 
Investigat
ion is 
ongoing 
 
25. 14 Mar16 MVSILVERMAID 
IMO 8716863 
MMSI 657826000 
Fishing 
Trawler 
 Around Dodo 
River Delta 
State 
One of her 
Crew 
Member 
fell 
Overboard 
during the 
Attack 
International 
Maritime 
Bureau 
( IMB ) 
Investigation is 
ongoing 
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26. 26 Mar 16 SAMPATIKI IMO 
9405772 
MMSI 636015901 
Tanker  Lat 040  
20’00”N 
Long 0050  
12’00’E 
5 Crew 
Members 
were 
Abducted 
International 
Maritime 
Bureau 
( IMB ) 
Five kidnapped 
crew members 
have being 
released 
27. 01 Apr 16 MT MADONNA 1 
IMO 9407031 
MMSI 370698000 
Cargo Panama Lat 030  54’N 
Long 0050  
40’E 
 International 
Maritime 
Bureau 
( IMB ) 
Sea Pirate 
Attacked the 
vessel 
investigation is 
ongoing 
28. 07 Apr 16 MT NORDIC 
FREEDOM 
IMO:9288887 
MMSI 311817000 
CALL SIGN 
Tanker Bahamas Lat 030  
18.6N 
Long 0050  
23.9E 
12 nm SW of 
Agbami 
Terminal 
Bayelsa State, 
Nigeria 
 International 
Maritime 
Bureau 
( IMB ) 
Sea Pirate 
Attacked the 
Vessel 
Investigation is 
Ongoing 
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29. 11 Apr 16 MT PULI IMO: 
9330434 
Tanker Malta Lat 0020  48’ 
43”N 
Long 0060  
40’ 95E 
90 nm SW of 
out of Port 
Harcourt 
6 Crew 
Members 
were 
Abducted 
International 
Maritime 
Bureau 
( IMB ) 
Sea Pirate 
Attacked the 
Vessel 
Investigation is 
Ongoing 
30. 11 Apr 16 M.T. OTTOMAN 
EQUITY IMO 
NO:9404950 
Tanker Turkish Lat 030  
17’08”N 
Long 0050  
31’00”E 
10,2 nm 
Agbami 
Terminal 
27 Crew 
Members 
on Board 
International 
Maritime 
Bureau 
( IMB ) 
Sea Pirate 
Attacked the 
Vessel 
Investigation is 
Ongoing 
31. 12 Apr 16 CMACGM 
TURQOISE IMO 
NO: 9386471 
MMSI NO: 
63601459 CALL 
SIGN A8RB5 
Cargo Liberia Lat 040  07 
33”N 
Long 0050  
24’ 12”E 
2 crew 
members 
has been 
released 
safely 
International 
Maritime 
Bureau 
( IMB ) 
Two kidnapped 
crew members 
have being 
released 
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32. 13 Apr 16 JOAN CHOUEST 
IMO 8127347 
MMSI 366847000 
 
Tug    International 
Maritime 
Bureau (IMB )  
Sea Pirate 
Attacked the 
Vessel 
Investigation is 
Ongoing 
 
33. 13 Apr 16 AKEMI JOE  
BUNKER 1 
Tug Nigeria  6 Crew 
Members 
were 
Kidnapped 
International 
Maritime 
Bureau 
( IMB ) 
Sea Pirate 
Attacked the 
Vessel 
Investigation is 
Ongoing 
34. 14 Apr 16 MV PROVIDER 1 Cargo    International 
Maritime 
Bureau 
( IMB ) 
Sea Pirate 
Attacked the 
Vessel 
Investigation is 
Ongoing 
35. 14 Apr 16 AKEMI JOE 
TIMTASCO 
Tug Nigeria  3 Crew 
Members 
Were 
Kidnapped 
International 
Maritime 
Bureau 
( IMB ) 
Sea Pirate 
Attacked the 
Vessel 
Investigation is 
Ongoing 
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36. 16 Apr 16 MT REMY Tanker   7 Crew 
Members 
Onboard 
Nigerians, 
4 
Pakistani, 
1 
Bangladesi
, 1 and 
Egyptian 1 
International 
Maritime 
Bureau 
( IMB ) 
Investigation is 
ongoing 
37. 18 Apr 16 MT MADONNA 1 
IMO 9407031 
MMSI 370698000 
Tanker Panama Lat 030  54’ 
75”N 
Long 0050  
38’03”E 
 International 
Maritime 
Bureau 
( IMB ) 
Sea Pirate 
Attempted to 
Board the  Vessel 
38. 19 Apr 16 MV ARMADA 
TUAH 101 IMO 
9387293 
Cargo Malaysia Lat 03 
30’06”N 
Long 040  
50’00”E 
15 Crew 
Members 
Onboard, 
2 Crew 
Members 
were 
released 
on 3 Jun 
16 
International 
Maritime 
Bureau  
( IMB ) 
The Vessel is 
Currently 
Proceeding to 
Onne Port 
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39. 20 APR 
2016 
AFRICAN 
BEAUTY IMO 
9047386 
Tanker Panama Lat 030  53’ 
5” N 
Long 0050  
22’ E 
 
Brass River 
Bayelsa State, 
Nigeria 
 International 
Maritime 
Bureau 
( IMB ) 
Sea Pirate 
Attempted to 
Board the  Vessel 
40. 20 Apr 16 BILBAO 
KNUTSEN IMO 
9236432 
Call Sing  ECER 
Tanker Spain Lat 030  45’ 
5”N 
Long 0060  
26’ E 
 International 
Maritime 
Bureau 
( IMB ) 
Sea Pirate 
Attempted to 
Board the  Vessel 
41. 20 Apr 16 VIGEO 
ADEBOLA IMO 
9355989 
Cargo  Lat 
03039.38N 
Long 
06008.24E  
33.3 
NM SW of 
Brass River 
Bayelsa State, 
Nigeria 
 International 
Maritime 
Bureau 
( IMB ) 
Investigation is 
ongoing 
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42. 21 Apr16 MT IGBERE IMO 
9206906 
MMSI  657314000 
Tanker  Lat 060 
00’59.56’’N 
Long 
003023’49.68
E 
The 
Captain of 
the ship 
was 
kidnapped 
International 
Maritime 
Bureau 
( IMB ) 
Investigation 
ongoing 
43. 28 APR 16 MT OLIVIA I  
IMO 9053111 
Tanker  030  56’59”N 
0040 43.66 E 
Around 
67NM SW of 
Bayelsa State, 
Nigeria 
 International 
Maritime 
Bureau 
( IMB ) 
Investigation is 
ongoing 
 
44. 28APR 16 MT GRACE Tanker  040  19.0N 
0040  27.0E 
Around 
78NM W of 
Bayelsa State, 
Nigeria 
 
 International 
Maritime 
Bureau 
( IMB ) 
Investigation is 
ongoing 
45. 04 May 16 MT MADONNA 1 
IMO 9407031 
MMSI 370698000 
Tanker Panama Lat 030  54’ 
01”N 
Long 0050  
17’06”E 
 International 
Maritime 
Bureau 
( IMB ) 
Sea Pirate 
Attempted to 
Board the  Vessel 
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46 05 May 16 MT MOXON IMO  
9133070 MMSI 
538006405 
Tanker  Lat 030  54’ 
00” N 
Long 050  
32’00’’E 
Brass River 
Bayelsa State, 
Nigeria 
 International 
Maritime 
Bureau 
( IMB ) 
Sea Pirate 
Attempted to 
Board the  Vessel 
47. 05 May  
16 
AFRICAN 
BEAUTY IMO 
9047386 
MMSI 37352700 
Tanker Panama Lat 030  52’ 
00” N 
Long 0050  
23’00’’E 
 
1.2nm NW of 
Agbami Oil 
Filed 
 International 
Maritime 
Bureau 
( IMB ) 
Sea Pirate 
Attempted to 
Board the  Vessel 
48. 05 May  
16 
PASSENGER 
BOAT 
Passenger 
Boat 
. Kaa in khana 
LGA 
2 Traders 
were 
killed, A 
child and 
the Driver 
of the boat 
were 
injured 
International 
Maritime 
Bureau 
( IMB ) 
Sea Pirate went 
away with the 
Boat 
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49. 06 May 16 MT HARLEY 
IMO 9133082 
Tanker    International 
Maritime 
Bureau 
( IMB ) 
Sea Pirate 
Attempted to 
Board the  Vessel 
50. 13 May 16 MT 
MONTESPAREN
ZA 
Tanker Portugal Lat 030  56’ 
00” N 
Long 0070  
02’00’’E 
Bonny River 
rivers State, 
Nigeria 
Failed 
Attempt 
International 
Maritime 
Bureau 
( IMB ) 
Sea Pirate 
Attempted to 
Board the  Vessel 
51. 25 Jun 16 MT 
PHILADEPHIA 
  Around
Opobo river, 
Rivers State, 
Nigeria 
The 
Captain 
and the 
chief 
engineer 
were 
abducted 
Intelligent 
Report 
Sea Pirate 
Attacked the 
Vessel 
Investigation is 
Ongoing 
52. 27 Jun 16 MV LILLY II   Qua-Iboe 
river, Akwa 
Ibom State, 
Nigeria 
One crew 
member 
killed 
Intelligent 
Report 
Sea Pirate 
Attacked the 
Vessel 
Investigation is 
Ongoing 
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53. 27 Jun 16 DREDGER Dredger Nigeria Emeroke 
River 
entrance, 
Akwa Ibom 
State, Nigeria 
The 
Captain, 
Chief 
Mate and 
2 other 
crew 
member 
were 
abducted 
Intelligent 
Report 
Sea Pirate 
Attacked the 
Vessel 
Investigation is 
Ongoing 
54. 07 Jul 16 PRINCE JOSEPH 
1 
Tug Nigeria Lat 03 09 
42N 
Long 004 47 
20.22E 
5 Crew 
Members 
Were 
Kidnapped 
International 
Maritime 
Bureau 
(IMB) 
5 Crew members 
have been 
released 
55. 07 Jul 16 MEDIATOR Passenger Nigeria Lat 03 11 
40.009N 
Long 004 41 
3.166E 
Failed 
Attempt 
International 
Maritime 
Bureau 
( IMB ) 
Sea Pirate 
Attempted to 
Board the  Vessel 
56. 07 Jul 16 BOUBOULINA 
IMO 9298753 
Tanker Greek Lat 030 
16’.91N Long 
0050  09.71E 
Failed 
Attempt 
International 
Maritime 
Bureau 
( IMB ) 
Sea Pirate 
Attempted to 
Board the  Vessel 
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57. 08 Jul16 TORM THYRA Tanker Singapore Lat 060  25 N 
Long 003 22E 
Attempted International 
Maritime 
Bureau 
( IMB ) 
A Robber 
Attempted to 
Board the  Vessel 
58. 26 Jul 16 MR AQUARIUS Tanker Marshal 
Island 
Lat 060  26, 
8.797”N 
Long 0030  
19, 37.283”E 
Attempted  Sea robbers 
attempted to 
board vessel 
59. 05 Aug 16 MT HARLEY Tanker Marshal 
Island 
Lat 060  43, 
3.408” N 
Long 0030  
36,8.923” E 
Pump man 
was taken 
hostage 
International 
Maritime 
Bureau ( IMB ) 
Sea robbers 
boarded vessel 
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60. 17 Aug 16 MT VECTIS 
OSPREY 
Cargo Isle of 
man/UK 
Lat 03054 
22.5” N 
Long 0070  
10 9.541” E 
13 crew 
members 
were in 
citadel 
International 
Maritime 
Bureau 
( IMB ) 
Sea Pirate 
Attacked the 
Vessel NNS 
NWAMBA 
intervened & 
recued the vessel. 
Vessel escorted 
to FOT ONNE 
by NNS 
NWAMBA for 
investigation. 
61. 16 Sep 16 MV HANZE 
KOCHI 
Tanker Gilbralter 
United 
Lat 040  10’ 
26.85’’N 
Long 0060  
59’ 24.334’’E 
 International 
Maritime 
Bureau 
( IMB ) 
Sea Pirate 
Attacked the 
Vessel 46NM 
SW around 
BAYELSA 
AREA 
62. 12 Oct 16 FISHERMEN Carted 
away 
outboard 
engines 
Opobo 
River,Akwa 
Ibom State 
   Attack 
Successful 
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63. 13 Oct 16 PASSENGERS 
BOATS 
Robbed 
their 
valuables 
Ataba –Kaa 
waterways 
Rivers State 
  Effort are 
ongoing by 
NNS JUBILEE 
and 
other security 
agencies 
Attack successful 
64. 14 Oct 16 LAGOS FISHING 
PORT 
 Opobo River 
Akwa-Ibom 
State 
   2 robbers were 
arrested by the 
Marine Police 
and currently 
assisting in the 
ongoing 
investigation 
65. 16 Oct 16 MT VAJARA Sterling 
Oil 
Company 
Agege 
Community 
in Delta State 
 NNS Delta 
deployed 
personnel 
on board 
the vessel 
1 killed 
Nigerian Navy Killed 1 NN 
personnel injured 
some 
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66 16 Oct 16  Tanker  Lat 040  13’ 
40.77’’N 
Long 0050  7’ 
40.83’’E 
 International 
Maritime 
Bureau 
( IMB ) 
12 Armed Pirates 
Approached and 
attempted to 
board the vessel 
while enroute to 
Lagos from PH. 
67. 27 Oct 16 MT BLESSED Tanker  Lat 040  16’ 
1.1’’N 
Long070  31’ 
22.4’’E 
ENC Nigerian Navy Attack 
Successful 
68. 27 Oct 16 MT NORTE Tanker   Lat 060 16’ 
28.873’’N 
Long0030 16’ 
51.175’’E 
WNC IMB Illegal Boarding 
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69. 12 Nov 16 MVPACIFIC 
PYTHON 
Tanker  Lat 020  48’ 
33N 
Long 0030  
59’ 8.4E 
 International 
Maritime 
Bureau 
( IMB ) 
Sea Pirate 
Attacked the 
Vessel 147NM 
SW around 
BAYELSA 
AREA, 5 Crew 
members were 
abducted. 
70. 19 Nov 16 MT MAYFAIR Tanker    Nigerian Navy Not verified 
71. 19 Nov 16 MV MAERSK 
COTONOU 
Cargo 3.2nm SW 
Bonny FWB 
  Nigerian Navy Attack 
unsuccessful 
72. 19 Nov 16 MV BOURBON 
ATLANTIDE 
 4nm from 
Bonny FWB 
  Nigerian Navy Attack 
Unsuccessful 
73. 23 Nov 16 MT ELIANA Tanker 34.1nm SE 
Bonga Oil 
Terminal 
Lat 0040 
54.279’’ N 
Long 0040 
48’26.935’’E 
 Intelligence Attack 
Unsuccessful 
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74. 23 Nov 16 FISHINGN 
TRAWLER 
 Ibeno 
Channel 
Akwa Ibom 
State 
 Intelligence 2 fisher man are 
hostages, efforts 
are ongoing to 
rescue the 
victims 
75. 28 Nov 16 MV SARONIC 
BRREEXE 
Cargo 22.1nmto 
Ramos River 
Entrance 
Lat 040 
57’02’’N 
Long 0050  
02’ 33’’E 
20 Crew 
members 
were 
onboard 
the Vessel 
International 
Maritime 
Bureau 
( IMB ) 
3 Crew members 
were abducted 
Investigation 
ongoing 
76. 12 Dec 16 MT ZEFYROS Tanker Lagos 
Anchorage 
Lat 060 18’ 
31’’N 
Long 0030  
21’ 66’’E 
21 Crew 
members 
were 
onboard 
the vessel 
International 
Maritime 
Bureau  
( IMB ) 
Attack 
Unsuccessful 
77. 15 Dec 16 MT ANTARTIC Tanker QuaIboe 
Anchorage 
- - International 
Maritime 
Bureau 
( IMB ) 
Attack 
Unsuccessful 
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78. 21 DEC 
16 
MAERSK 
CALABAR 
Cargo Singapore Lat 030  
16’59.466’’N 
Long 0050  
09’ 42.131’’E 
166.1nm SW 
of Agbami 
Oil Terminal 
 
 combrest@pre
mar- 
atlatrque.gouv.f
r 
(COMBREST) 
Attack 
Unsuccessful 
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APPENDIX 6 
SUMMARY OF VESSELS ATTACKS IN NIGERIAN WATERS  
CHART SHOWING NUMBER OF ATTACKS ON VESSELS IN NIGERIAN WATERS JANUARY 2013 –2015 
2013 2014 Jan 2015 till date 
Year 
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
30 
3 
27 
15 
No of Attacks Vessels 
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FROM JANUARY 2013 – NOVEMBER 2015 
Serial Attacks on Vessels  2013 Attacks on Vessels 2014 Attacks on Vessels 2015 Total Remarks 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
1. 3 27 15 47  
FROM JANUARY 2013 – DECEMBER 2015  
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APPENDIX 7 
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FOREWORD 
Maritime Law Enforcement (MLE) remains an indispensable tool and process for 
emplacing effective governance in the national maritime space. In the face of emergent 
challenges occasioned by diverse threats and criminalities, it has become necessary to 
address attendant inadequacies hindering the effort of Maritime Law Enforcement 
Agencies (MLEAs) in checkmating illegalities in Nigeria's maritime environment. 
 
As the Chief Prosecutor of the nation, I have interacted with most of the MLEAs and 
come to appreciate the enormity of their challenges in taking custody of arrested 
vessels, persons and evidences as well as ensuring that maritime offenders are 
prosecuted in a Court of competent jurisdiction. In this regard, I wholeheartedly 
identify with the noble initiative that produced this Harmonised Standard Operating 
Procedures (HSOP) designed to guide the operation of MLEA. I am satisfied that the 
document adequately addresses the issues of overlap of responsibilities of agencies as 
it also spells out processes to be followed to protect the rights of both the MLEA and 
suspects during arrest, detention and prosecution. In addressing the dynamic nature of 
threat within the maritime environment, the HSOP will be reviewed every 3 years. 
 
Effective implementation of the HSOP demands conscious domestication of its 
guidelines into the doctrinal process of all MLEAs. I, therefore, urge all concerned to 
ensure adequate knowledge penetration of the HSOP into the day-to-day MLE activities 
across the nation's maritime space. 
 
 
ABUBAKAR MALAMI, SAN 
Attorney- General of the Federation and Minister for Justice 
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CHAPTER 1  
GENERAL REGULATIONS 
PART 1 
THE COMMITMENT AND GOAL 
 
1. (1) This document serves as a guide and prescribes standard operating 
procedures for the Agencies operating within Nigeria's maritime area in relation to 
arrest, detention and prosecution of vessels and persons. 
The Standard 
Operating 
Procedures 
(2) Recognizing that in carrying out assigned statutory responsibilities, 
maritime law enforcement agencies are empowered to effect arrest of vessels and 
persons deemed to be contravening or have contravened the Laws of Nigeria or 
International Conventions ratified or acceded to by Nigeria; 
 
(3) Desiring to promote synergy through constructive dialogue and 
wishing to further foster closer cooperation on matters of common interest in 
maritime law enforcement; 
 
(4) Mindful of existing mandates of individual participating agencies and 
relationship among parties and understanding that the Harmonized Standard 
Operating Procedures (HSOP) shall not prejudice the rights and obligations of all 
parties under the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) 
and the various Enactments or Acts establishing the agencies; 
 
(5) Re-Affirming their common concern to adopt a common document known 
as HSOP andGuided by the provisions of the HSOP, hereby express commitment to 
the faithful emplacement of effective maritime law enforcement including expeditious 
management of actions and issues relating to arrest, detention and prosecution of 
vessels, owners and crew who infringe on Nigerian Laws or International 
Conventions ratified or acceded to by Nigeria. 
 
(6) This HSOP is therefore prepared to outline the appropriate procedure for 
arrest, detention and handing over of vessels consistent with global best practices. It 
is based on the statutory powers conferred on the Ministries, Departments and 
Agencies (MDAs) charged with maritime law enforcement activities. It is designed 
for use by all agencies connected with arrest, detention and prosecution of maritime 
related crimes, and illegalities committed, or suspected to have been committed 
within Nigeria's maritime area. 
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Purpose of this 
document 
2. The primary objective of this HSOP is to provide consolidated guidelines on 
arrest, detention and prosecution of vessels, persons as well as 
seizures/forfeiture of goods (where applicable). It outlines proper procedures to 
safeguard enforcement agencies from litigations arising from the discharge of their 
legitimate duties. The HSOP is also relevant to those responsible for, or undertaking, 
any enforcement related activities, in line with global best practices which also aligns 
itself with relevant legal provisions of Nigeria. 
The Primary 
objective 
3. (1) The membership of the Stakeholders shall include those listed in Part 1 of 
Chapter 3 of this regulation. 
 
(2) The Observer agencies are as listed in Part 2 of Chapter 3 of this regulation. 
4. (1) The membership of the Stakeholders shall include those listed in Part 1 of 
Chapter 3 of this regulation. 
(2) The Observer agencies are as listed in Part 2 of Chapter 3 of this regulation.  
Membership 
5. The core and subsidiary functions of law enforcement agencies for arrest, 
detention and prosecution of vessels/persons suspected to be involved in the 
commission of a maritime related crime as shown in the Table at Appendix 2. 
Core functions 
of the law 
enforcement 
agencies 
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CHAPTER 3 
MEMBERSHIP PART 1 
1. Membership of the Stakeholders Forum will be constituted by one or two 
representatives from the participating agencies. This is to ensure that the Forum is 
representative of all critical actors in order to create an optimum environment for 
efficiency and effectiveness. Participants from the various Ministries and Agencies 
are expected to be between top and middle management cadre. 
  
2. The membership of the Forum is constituted as follows: 
a. Ministry of Defence (DHQ, AHQ, NHQ, HQ NAF) 
 
b. Federal Ministry of Justice (DPPF, NDLEA, EFCC, 
NAPTIP) 
 
c. Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (FDF) 
 
d. Federal Ministry of Transportation (NIMASA, NPA, 
NIWA) 
 
e. Ministry of Interior (NPF, NSCDC, NIS) 
 
f. Federal Ministry of Finance ( NCS ) 
 
g. Federal Ministry of Petroleum Resources (DPR) 
 
h. Federal Ministry of Environment (NOSDRA, NESREA) 
 
 
